The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
241.
Mr Campbell
wrote that, during the telephone call, President Bush had been
“very
solicitous”
about Mr Blair’s political position and had “said he was
determined to help”
get a
second resolution.65
242.
The record of
the discussion confirms Mr Campbell’s comment.66
243.
Mr Campbell
also wrote that President Bush had been “livid with the French
and
Germans,
less so with the Russians.67
But he was
just as worried as TB was.” Mr Blair
“said the
problem was everyone accepted Saddam was bad, evil, and a threat,
but they
didn’t
necessarily believe that gave you a reason to go to war. We had to
be the people
putting
forward one last push for peace.”
244.
In a
subsequent conversation with Dr Rice, Sir David Manning said
that in his
report on
14 February, Dr Blix would need to answer the questions which
had been
raised at
the end of January. They were central to the issue of
non-co-operation.68
245.
In a
discussion on public opinion, Sir David Manning said that the
position
in the UK
was:
“… a great
deal more difficult … There was a strong wish to find a peaceful
way of
disarming
Saddam and avoid taking military action. French and German claims
that
this was
still possible were seized on eagerly, however implausible the
proposals …”
246.
Sir David and
Dr Rice also discussed the possibility of public statements
from
President
Bush emphasising that resolving the Iraq crisis through the UN was
critical
to the
future of the Security Council. Sir David encouraged Dr Rice
to consider whether
President
Bush would be willing to speak out strongly about the need to give
new
impetus to
the MEPP: “That would have a great impact” on international
opinion.
247.
Mr Campbell
wrote that, on 11 February, Mr Blair had “decided that maybe
we
took the
wrong line” on the Der
Spiegel report,
“maybe we should say it was interesting
because it
accepted conventional inspections wouldn’t work and was effectively
arguing
for taking
the country over without saying so”. Mr Blair and No.10
officials had “grasped
our way to
a plan that was basically wait for Blix, then surface the elements
of a second
resolution
that included the ultimatum, then Saddam to go, and if he didn’t we
were
65
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
66
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush,
11 February’.
67
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
68
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
69
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
224