1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
842.
Mr Ekéus
commented to the Inquiry that the Security Council had “dissolved
…
arguably
[the] most successful inspection regime in disarmament history” and
suggested
it was “the
British Government and its Foreign Secretary Robin Cook that
enforced the
dissolution
of UNSCOM … in spite of American doubts and
hesitations”.321
843.
Dr Hans Blix,
the Director General of the IAEA until November 1997,
was
appointed
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and took up his appointment in New
York
on
1 March 2000.
“The
inspectors were gone. The sanctions were condemned by a broad
world
opinion and
… they had become less painful, and were eroding … The
revenues
from the
Oil-for-Food Program provided many billions of dollars and huge
purchase
orders were
so placed as to produce maximum political benefit – or
punishment.”322
845.
In an
interview published in March 2000, Mr Ekéus stated that UNSCOM
had been
“highly
successful”, but had not destroyed “everything”; and the
“contradictions” in Iraq’s
declarations
meant that there was “reason to be careful”.323
There was
“new information
about
procurement efforts by Iraq” and useful information from
individuals who had
left Iraq.
846.
Mr Ekéus
added that, in his view, there were “no large quantities of
weapons”. Iraq
was not
“especially eager in the biological and chemical area to produce
such weapons
for
storage” because it viewed them as “tactical assets” and its aim
was “to keep the
capability
to start up production immediately should it need to”.
847.
Mr Ekéus
stated that it was “striking” that resolution 1284 (1999) said
“nothing
about
investigation and elimination” of Iraq’s prohibited weapons, but
focused on
monitoring
activities. The Security Council was trying to get UNMOVIC “to be
more
precise”
about its tasks. He considered that Iraq would “probably
co-operate” if it judged
the
provisions on suspending sanctions were acceptable. The unity of
the Security
Council was
essential; political problems in the Council were “the single,
dominant and
only
reason” for the failure of UNSCOM.
848.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote:
“In 2000,
little new work was done on Iraq, with the Security Council
largely
exhausted
with the subject … Sanctions continued, but the regime
remained
vulnerable
to Iraqi non-co-operation and deceit and the feeling that
sanctions
321
Statement,
23 April 2011, pages 4-5.
322
Blix
H. Disarming
Iraq.
Bloomsbury, 2004.
323 Arms
Control Association, March 2000, ‘Shifting Priorities: UNMOVIC and
the Future of Inspections
in Iraq:
An Interview with Ambassador Rolf Ekéus’.
185