9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
•
would
assume immediate control of Iraqi institutions responsible for
military
and security
matters; and
•
was
facilitating the efforts of the Iraqi people to take the first
steps towards
forming a
representative government.
320.
The joint
letter concluded by saying that the Coalition was ready to work
closely
with
representatives of the UN and its agencies and looked forward to
the appointment
of a
Special Co-ordinator by the Secretary-General.197
The letter
described the UN as
“helping”
with the formation of the IIA.
321.
On the same
day as the letter was sent, the FCO briefed British posts in
countries
that were
members of the Security Council on the content of the resolution
and the
Security
Council process.198
322.
The resolution
would be sponsored by the UK, US and Spain and the text
would
be
circulated on 9 May. The brief, sent in Mr Straw’s name, observed
“we expect a
tough
negotiation” but also that “this is not a take it or leave it
text”. The FCO anticipated
criticism
for:
•
not giving
the UN the lead role in political reconstruction;
•
lifting
sanctions before disarmament had been proven;
•
giving the
Coalition control of oil revenues;
•
silence on
WMD inspection;
•
winding
down the OFF programme more quickly than humanitarian
needs
suggested
was wise; and
•
vagueness
about how the Iraq Assistance Fund would work.
323.
Rebutting
these criticisms, the brief stated that “a UN Special Co-ordinator
can
play a
crucial role, including [in] the political process” and “we can see
the merits of an
eventual
role for a reconstituted UNMOVIC/IAEA”.
324.
By 9 May it
was plain that negotiations for an MOU were unlikely to
succeed.199
Instead the
IPU suggested that the UK send a letter to the US Administration,
setting out
the UK’s
view of the principles on which ORHA would operate.
325.
In
conversation with Sir David Manning on 9 May, after the draft
resolution was
circulated,
Dr Rice commented “that very early reactions looked promising”. It
was clear
that more
specific mention of the IIA and something about verification of WMD
would
have to be
added to the draft.200
197
The
original document says ‘Security-General’. This has been amended to
‘Secretary-General’ based
on an
understanding of context.
198
Telegram 74
FCO London to Berlin, 8 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Post Conflict Resolution
at the UNSC’.
199
Minute
Chatterton Dickson to Private Secretary [FCO], 9 May 2003, ‘Iraq:
ORHA: MOU’.
200
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 9 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
185