3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

“benchmarks” for co-operation by “filleting” Dr Blix’s paper. If the benchmarks were

set high and Saddam Hussein co-operated, the US and UK would have “won by a

different route”. Although Secretary Powell had reservations about including benchmarks

in a second resolution, they agreed that Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Ambassador

Negroponte should discuss a list with Dr Blix.

585. In response to a request for advice in preparation for Mr Blair’s discussion with

President Bush, Sir David Manning wrote that:

• Mr Blair should seek to secure President Bush’s agreement to delay a vote

in the Security Council until 14/15 March to provide “a few, precious extra

days … [which] might make the difference to securing the critical nine votes”.

• The second resolution should be “very simple, declaring Saddam in violation/

breach of [resolution] 1441 – without specifying what happens or when”. That

should be accompanied by tough tests “agreed with Blix if possible” which

Saddam Hussein would have to pass “in full”. Sir David wrote that Saddam

Hussein “almost certainly won’t comply. If he does, we’ve won anyway”; the

tests should “stick to what is stipulated in resolution 1441 and to the general

disarmament categories, otherwise Saddam will play games”; and that the UK

would be looking for “yes/no answers” from Dr Blix.

• There would also be a much better chance of gaining support for the resolution

if it was clear that the UN would have a “key role” after any military action

and that a “massive humanitarian aid programme” would be instituted; and

by publishing and implementing the Road Map on Israel/Palestine before

any military action. Sir David advised that both points would be a “tough sell”

with President Bush, but “both are very important in helping us to win the

argument”.160

586. Following a discussion between Mr Blair and Mr Straw, Mr Ricketts sent

Sir David Manning an illustrative list of benchmarks, which Dr Blix could be encouraged

“to propose alongside a simple draft resolution”.161 Mr Straw recommended allowing a

few days before tabling the draft resolution early the following week.

587. Mr Ricketts wrote that Dr Blix had “spoken about selecting benchmarks from

the list of unresolved disarmament issues which UNMOVIC has drawn up (the cluster

document)”; and that it would “not be easy to circulate the cluster document before

1 March”.

588. Mr Ricketts suggested the UK could propose its own benchmarks as a way

to get Dr Blix to focus quickly. The illustrative list covered biological weapons,

chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, documentation and unrestricted interviews

with key personnel.

160 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Points for Bush’.

161 Letter Ricketts to Manning, 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: The Way Forward in the Security Council’.

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