14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

470. In considering the “failure to provide appropriate protected mobility on operations”,

ECAB noted that the mitigating action to cover the risk included:

• “Improve ECM: two sets of the new equipment had been delivered to Iraq in

a trial to meet the threat from IEDs.”

• “Replace Snatch 1 with Snatch 2/Vector: Snatch 2 was more reliable than

Snatch 1 but still had the same protection and mobility characteristics. Although

money had been allocated towards the Vector project, a vehicle solution had yet

to be identified.”

• “Examine early replacement of Saxon with Warrior/improved FV430: Warrior

is the only vehicle currently available to the Army which provided significant

protection against EFP IEDs. Any additional battalions equipped with Warrior to

fill the AV [Armoured Vehicle] gap on operations need only be trained on its use

for mobility requirements and not full manoeuvre capability.”

• “Maintain FRES ISD of 2012.”

471. At its meeting on 19 January 2006, ECAB was given a presentation on the

progress of the Assessment Phase for FRES in the light of the critical decisions required

for the programme to maintain momentum, including the extent to which “the Army was

prepared to compromise on capability … to achieve an early ISD” for FRES.250 Final

decisions would be taken by Ministers on the advice of the IAB.

472. In a paper for ECAB about the FRES Fleet Review, Brig Moore concluded that

further work was necessary and the earliest that an initial operating capability (which

would meet the requirements for survivability and future growth) could be achieved was

2015 to 2018.251

473. The paper stated that full operating capability would not be delivered until beyond

2023. That meant that some elements of the current fleet would be over 60 years old

before they were taken out of service, and additional funding would be required.

474. The paper stated that, although the US Stryker vehicle could be procured to fulfil

the Utility FRES variant “around 2013”, that option had been discounted because it

would only be available in its current configuration. For the “FRES era”, this model

offered insufficient protection, lacked growth potential and the UK was unlikely to be able

to make any necessary modifications to it.

475. A second paper by Brig Moore, on the implications of the Fleet Review on the

Army’s AV capability, detailed how the FRES delays had “exacerbated” the Armoured

Personnel Carrier (APC) vehicle gap; Saxon’s limitations made it unsafe for use on

operations but there was currently no alternative vehicle available.252 Gen Dannatt had

250 Minutes, 19 January 2006, Executive Committee of the Army Board meeting.

251 Paper DEC(GM), 12 January 2006, ‘Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) Fleet Review Outcome’.

252 Paper DEC(GM), 13 January 2006, ‘The Implications of the Outcome of the Future Rapid Effect System

Fleet Review on the Armoured Vehicle Fleet’.

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