The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

297.  No.10 officials commented that “the atmospherics at this video conference were

poorer than at previous discussions in this series”. They had agreed changes to make

reference to the “Occupying Power” rather than solely to the CPA, and to include

monitoring, as well as auditing, of oil sales. Agreement could not be reached on the

description of the UN’s role in the political process or on extending OFF further.

298.  The draft resolution was updated the same day.183 It continued to reflect US views

on the UN’s role in establishing the IIA, the control of oil proceeds (now designated the

Iraqi Assistance Fund) and the continuation of the OFF programme.

299.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry that in the process of reaching agreement

on the objectives for the resolution:

“… there were nuances between London and Washington … We could see, rather

as was the case in Resolution 1441 … the United States was setting the bar quite

high in terms of what it wanted from the United Nations … they wanted the situation

of the United States leading the Coalition with a unilateral decision-making capability

for that Coalition with the United States very much the largest member of it, with the

United Nations endorsing that situation and coming in with its ancillary services to

help deal with the territory … we went through a minor version of the same process

as 1441, where we had to scale Washington’s more unilateral ambitions back down

to something that was negotiable within the Security Council. The Security Council

… had, as always, a range of opinions, with the Russians in particular being very

clear that they would not allow any resolution to pass that appeared to legitimise

in any way what had already happened.”184

300.  Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by telephone on 7 May on a broad range of

foreign policy issues.185

301.  They discussed taking a firm line in the Security Council; if NATO and the UN

became involved, others would be drawn in. Mr Blair added that their involvement would

also provide an exit strategy.

302.  Mr Blair commented that ORHA “must grip the nuts and bolts of reconstruction,

not just focus on politics”.

303.  Mr Ricketts wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary on 7 May, with a ‘Diplomatic

Game-Plan’ for sharing the draft resolution with other Security Council members “now

that we are almost at closure on an opening draft”.186

183  Minute Bellinger to Rycroft and Manning, 6 May 2003, ‘Revised draft UNSCR’ attaching ‘Resolution

on Post-Conflict Iraq’.

184  Public hearing, 15 December 2010, pages 32-33.

185  Letter Cannon to McDonald, 7 May 2003, ‘US Foreign Policy Issues: Prime Minister’s Conversation

with Bush, 7 May’.

186  Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 May 2003, ‘Iraq Resolution: Diplomatic Game-Plan’.

182