The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
510.
Copies of Mr
Rycroft’s letter were sent to Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary, and
to
Sir Richard
Dearlove, Mr Scarlett, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Sir Christopher
Meyer.
511.
A separate,
fuller record of the discussion was prepared for Sir David
Manning
and Mr
Powell.202
It focused
on the “central issue of a casus belli” and the need
for
further
work on the optimal route to achieving that. Sir David should work
with the
White House
on the possibility of a Security Council resolution and how an
ultimatum
might
be fashioned.
512.
Mr Blair told
President Bush that he was not yet fully abreast of all the
military
options.
513.
Mr Rycroft
commented that the UK now had “an opening to explore …
precisely
how the
ultimatum would be framed, and how we would pursue
it”.
514.
In
preparation for a meeting with President Bush in early
September,
No.10
commissioned further advice for Mr Blair. But Mr Blair was adamant
that
knowledge
of the substance of his proposals to President Bush should be
limited.
515.
Mr Rycroft
commissioned more detailed advice from the FCO on a UN
ultimatum,
“both on
what it would look like and on how we would achieve it”, for Mr
Blair’s return
to work
in late August.203
516.
Sir David
Manning sent the records of his conversations with Dr Rice
and
President
Bush and No.10’s internal note of Mr Blair’s telephone call with
President
Bush to the
FCO on 1 August, for Mr Straw “to pick up on 19 August” before the
possible
meeting
with Secretary Powell.204
517.
In his minute
to Mr Straw, Sir David wrote:
“The Prime
Minister is adamant that they [the papers] must be seen by
no-one
but you.
They are not being copied anywhere else in Whitehall. Only you and
he
are
therefore fully aware of what was said and what has now been
decided on
follow up.”
518.
In a separate
letter to Mr Brenton at the British Embassy Washington on
2 August,
Sir David
Manning sent a copy of the records of the discussions with Dr Rice
and
President
Bush, with an instruction that they were to be seen by Mr Brenton
and
Sir Christopher
Meyer only. They were not to be mentioned to anyone else in
Whitehall
202
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with President Bush,
31 July’.
203
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with President Bush,
31 July’.
204
Minute
Manning to Secretary of State [FCO], 1 August 2002,
‘Iraq’.
205
Letter
Manning to Brenton, 2 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
88