12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
On 12 June
2007, Maj Gen Wall briefed the Chiefs of Staff that the
Iraqi Minister of
Defence had
recently called for MND(SE) to have two army divisions; one for
Basra
City and
one for the rest of the South‑East.1280
Maj Gen Wall
reported that there was no
indication
of how this new division would be raised, funded or
equipped.
At the
Chiefs of Staff meeting on 26 June, Lt Gen Houghton reported
that “greater clarity”
had been
achieved.1281
The 10th
Division would be given an additional brigade; a new
14th Division
which would assume responsibility for the rest of the South‑East,
with nine
brigades
across Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Maysan provinces.
Lt
Gen Houghton stated that work would continue on training 1,000
personnel, primarily
pre‑2003
Iraqi Army personnel, to form the Presidential Guard Force who
would take
control of
Basra Palace. The force was due to be ready by 14
August.
On 17 July,
Maj Gen Wall briefed the Chiefs of Staff that a
Ministerial Order had been
issued for
the creation of 14th Division, which would now have
responsibility for Basra.1282
The 10th
Division would “reposture” with its headquarters in either al‑Amara
or Nasiriyah.
1395.
On 19 July,
Major General Gerald Berragan, Deputy Commander
(Operations)
Multi‑National
Corps‑Iraq, reported on a meeting of the Crisis Action Cell earlier
that
week.1283
He wrote
that Gen Mohan’s description of Basra at the meeting was
that:
•
The police
were infiltrated by militia and unreliable.
•
The 1st
Brigade of 10th Division were “defeated”.
•
The 5th
Brigade was still in formation and lacking key
capabilities.
•
The ISF was
set against a complex political environment with 24 militias
all
armed and
competing for power.
•
Iran was
influencing and gathering intelligence.
•
Organised
crime was rife and weapons were being openly sold in the
streets.
1396.
In advance of
a planned NSID(OD) meeting on 19 July, FCO and MOD
officials
produced a
joint paper, setting out the latest assessment and plans for
security
transition
and the associated re‑posturing and drawdown of UK troops in Basra,
to
inform
decisions by Ministers at that meeting (see Section
9.6).1284
The paper
described
the
strategic context across Iraq and then focused on what that meant
for transition
in Basra.
The US, parts of the Iraqi Government and Gen Mohan,
Maj Gen Jalil and
Gen Habib
had serious concerns over the ability of the ISF in Basra to cope
with the
security
situation. On the other hand Gen Mohan’s and
Maj Gen Shaw’s assessment
1280
Minutes, 12
June 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
1281
Minutes, 26
June 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
1282
Minutes, 17
July 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
1283
Minute
Berragan to CJO, 19 July 2007, ‘MNC‑I Update – 19 Jul
07’.
1284
Paper FCO
and MOD, 12 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Transition in Basra’.
379