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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
SSR in the South: after the invasion
Multi‑National Division (South‑East)
Multi‑National Division (South‑East) (MND(SE)) was established on 12 July.374 That
formalised the UK’s responsibility for maintaining security in the provinces of Basra,
Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Maysan, initially as an Occupying Power and, from June 2004,
in support of the Iraqi Government. That area of Iraq is often referred to as ‘the South’.
432.  On 14 April, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that the South of Iraq was
“largely under British control”.375 In Basra:
“About 200 policemen have reported for work. Joint patrols started on 13 April. In
surrounding towns, looting has either ceased or is declining, local patrols are being
re‑established and co‑operation with city councils is going well.”
433.  In response to a question from Mr Iain Duncan Smith, the Leader of the
Opposition, Mr Blair told Members of Parliament (MPs):
“Of course the British forces will stay until there is proper security in the country,
although obviously we hope to ensure that some of the policing is done by local
people as soon as possible. That is why it is encouraging that joint patrols are
already taking place. Although people may find this strange, much of the problem for
Iraqi citizens came from the special security forces, not the ordinary civil police, if I
may put it like that. Many of those people could perform an adequate and good task
for the future of Iraq. Other countries are already offering help in relation to policing
and security.”376
434.  Responding to a proposal by Mr Jeffrey M Donaldson that the UK should draw
on the experience of retired Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers to police Iraq,
Mr Blair said:
“We should look at using retired RUC officers. Indeed, the Defence Secretary
tells me that representatives of our UK police have gone out to Iraq to see what
assistance we can give.”377
435.  Pressed by Mr Nicholas Soames to “take seriously” Mr Donaldson’s point, Mr Blair
added that deploying former officers was “a priority for us, because the better we can
maintain order, the better it is for the people of Iraq and the less is the pressure on our
soldiers”.378
374  Report Lamb, 30 January 2004, ‘Post Operational Tour Report – Version 1 Operation Telic 2/3
11 July to 28 December 2003’.
375  House of Commons, Official Report, 14 April 2003, columns 615‑616.
376  House of Commons, Official Report, 14 April 2003, column 619.
377  House of Commons, Official Report, 14 April 2003, column 625.
378  House of Commons, Official Report, 14 April 2003, columns 628‑629.
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