3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
358.
Mr Mohamed
Aldouri, Iraqi Permanent Representative to the UN, who spoke at
the
beginning
and end of the debate, stated that:
•
The US and
UK had propagated “falsehoods and untrue allegations”
about
“Iraq’s compliance and implementation of the relevant
Security
Council resolutions”.
•
Ninety-five
percent of the disarmament tasks had been completed
between
1991 and
1994.
•
Dr Blix
had reported on 7 March that Iraq was “proactively
co-operating”.
•
There were
“no obstacles” to inspections, which were “serious,
effective
and immediate”.
•
Iraq had
recently unilaterally declared its missile programme and was
destroying
the Al
Samoud 2 missiles which UNMOVIC had deemed to be
proscribed.
•
None of the
“allegations” presented to the Council by Secretary Powell
on
5 February
had “proved to be true”.
•
The most
recent “intelligence report produced by the UK” (the No.10
dossier
‘Iraq – Its
Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’ –
see
Section
4.3), contained previously published information.
•
It was
important for Iraq to view the “clusters” document presented on 7
March
“in order
to implement” the main tasks required “as soon as possible and
to
study such
questions and answer them”.
•
Recent
allegations about RPVs were unfounded. They were small
experimental
aircraft
which had been examined by the inspectors.
359.
In both his
opening and closing statements, Mr Aldouri stated that Iraq
had “taken
the
strategic decision” to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction.
In his concluding
statement,
he warned that war would bring “incalculable catastrophe”, and
asked for
time to
provide what evidence Iraq could to the international community to
prove it had
no weapons
of mass destruction. He appealed to the Security Council not to
“stand idly
by” in the
face of the “clear, present and serious” threat to
Iraq.
360.
A number of
states supported the draft resolution tabled by the US, UK and
Spain,
giving Iraq
a deadline, including Kuwait, Australia and Japan. The majority,
however,
argued that
inspections should be given more time in an effort to avoid
war.
361.
UK
diplomatic posts were informed that the UK was “working flat out
for
a second
resolution”, and there was a possibility of a short extension of
the
deadline of
17 March.
461