9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

their assistance. Asked whether the move from Basra Palace to the air base had shown

that the UK presence was part of the problem, Mr Brown commented:

“… it was before our troops withdrew from Basra Palace that the security situation in

that area became a great deal calmer. Because we are training up the Iraqi Security

Forces, they are in a position to police and provide security to that area. Far from

moving quickly out of Iraq … our presence to train and mentor [the Iraqi Security

Forces] is an important element in bringing about a calm, or calmer, security

situation. On the basis of that calmer security situation, we can build a better future

for the Iraqi people.”

496. By 9 October, the JAM suspension of activity had reached its sixth week and

mainstream JAM elements remained compliant.238 Continued attacks had been attributed

to the Iranian-backed JAM Special Groups. Mr Tony Pawson, the Deputy Chief of

Defence Intelligence, briefed the Chiefs of Staff that the freeze was “unlikely to endure”.

497. Lt Gen Wall told the Chiefs of Staff that there would be a need for “careful

handling” of the “differing long term US/UK strategic approaches to Iraq”.

498. Mr Prentice reported on 10 October that the public reaction to Mr Brown’s

statement in Iraq had been low-key.239 Reductions in troop levels had already been

widely reported during Mr Brown’s visit, and many Iraqi politicians had left Baghdad

for Eid.

499. Mr Brown met Secretary Gates on 11 October and reassured him that the UK

“would continue to fulfil its international obligations”.240 He explained that it would be

important to accompany progress on security with political and economic improvements

to demonstrate a “peace dividend”. The UK was particularly focused on Basra’s

economic regeneration.

500. Maj Gen Binns commented in his weekly update on 11 October that the content of

Mr Brown’s statement had been welcomed in MND(SE) because:

“We now have a medium term policy, endorsed by Ministers, for our involvement

in Iraq.”241

501. Government officials working closely with the military met JAM1 again on

11 October.242 JAM1 had not yet received a response from Muqtada al-Sadr to his

letter. He said that a delegation from OMS/JAM in Basra might travel to Najaf to speak

238 Minutes, 9 October 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

239 eGram 41700/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 10 October 2007, ‘Iraq: Reaction to the Prime Minister’s

8 October Statement’.

240 Letter Fletcher to Forber, 11 October 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with US Defence Secretary’.

241 Minute Binns to CJO, 11 October 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –

11 October 2007’.

242 Email government official working closely with the military, 12 October 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:

Meeting with [JAM1] 11 October’.

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