The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
but not
conclusive”. Similarly, the extent of disarmament “could perhaps be
judged
on the
basis of progress noted on some key issues (as was specified in
resolution
1284 (1999))
rather than the whole catalogue of issues”. Although some of the
measures
required
might not be possible, because of lack of documents or witnesses,
“it would
probably be
possible to see whether Iraq provided active, genuine co-operation
to solve
the issues
rather than dragging its feet and be evasive”.
579.
The UK Mission
provided an illustrative text for a draft resolution, including
a
request
that UMOVIC and the IAEA submit a list of unresolved disarmament
issues and
questions
“by [1 March] … indicating which, in their view are key points, and
what …
Iraq should
do to solve these issues and to answer these questions”. The draft
left open
the date by
which UNMOVIC and the IAEA would be asked to submit a report with
their
judgement
on whether the issues and questions had been resolved and Iraq had
fulfilled
its
obligations.
580.
Mr Straw
and Mr Blair discussed the way ahead before a telephone call
with
President
Bush. As result, the FCO produced an illustrative list of
benchmarks
which
Dr Blix could be encouraged to propose alongside a “simple
draft
resolution”
declaring Saddam Hussein to be in breach of resolution
1441.
581.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice on 18 February that the European Council
had
“gone well”
and that the “emphasis had been on the need for Saddam’s swift
and
full
compliance” with resolution 1441: “Recourse to force, once other
options were
exhausted
had been conceded albeit reluctantly in the usual
quarters.”158
582.
Sir David and
Dr Rice discussed the next steps, including the nature of a
second
resolution
declaring simply that Saddam was in violation of resolution 1441;
the
possibility
of a vote after Dr Blix’s next report to the Security Council
and the advantages
and risks
of setting rigorous benchmarks requiring total compliance to judge
Saddam’s
performance.
583.
Sir David told
Dr Rice that Mr Blair’s preference was for a vote on 14
March. That:
“… had the
advantage of playing to the date proposed by the French. But it
also
gave us a
precious extra few days to secure nine votes. In the end this was
what it
was about.
We had to fashion our ultimatum and choose our timing to give
ourselves
the very
best chance of getting the necessary majority … this was critically
important
for us
politically.”
584.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that the UK needed a second resolution,
and
that
“everything now had to be subordinate to that”.159
He
suggested setting Iraq
158
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
159
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation
with Colin Powell,
18 February 2003’.
284