The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1150.
On the same
day, a USUR for an “active interdict capability” was generated
from
theatre,
which was endorsed by PJHQ on 29 December.605
1151.
On 15
December, Brig Everard wrote in his post‑operation tour report
that
“the IDF
threat to base locations remained substantial throughout the
tour”.606
1152.
Brig Everard
also wrote:
“Despite
considerable effort we failed to win the Counter‑Indirect Fire
(C‑IDF) battle,
with
strategic implications as OGD [other government departments]
reduced their
footprint.”
1153.
On 19 January
2007, Maj Gen Shirreff wrote in his post‑operation tour
report:
“… we have
missed the boat on the ISTAR front. I commented in my first
weekly
letter six
months ago: ‘it beggars belief, that after 3 years here, the
British Army
possesses
no tactical
UAV capable of flying in the heat of the summer.’ I was
told
no more
staff effort could be put into resolving the problem, but despite
this it will
be sometime
before anything is in service in theatre. Contrast this grindingly
slow
and
ponderous response to the Americans’ generous support with Raven or
the
Australians
who have shown the agility and forethought to lease 6 Scan
Eagles
from
Boeing, together with 3 ground stations … It took a couple of weeks
to clear
the
decision, two weeks to train the soldiers and Boeing technicians
have deployed
to maintain
the systems. As a result, contrast what we know about events in
As
Samawah
with what we do not know about al‑Amarah. As for strike operations,
more
than
anything else, this battle is about day and night long loiter
capability … tracking
the target
– for days if necessary … then striking to detain him. This has
been a
critical
factor in the successful battle against AQI [Al Qaida in Iraq] and
until we have
the same
capability we will continue to strike relatively blind against
militant JAM.
“If our
procurement system were capable of similar agility we would have
UAVs on
station
tracking targets now.”607
1154.
On IDF,
Maj Gen Shirreff wrote that attacks in Basra had
“increased throughout
the year,
approximately doubling every 2 to 3 months”. He added later in the
report that
protection
against IDF had “become a primary concern”.
1155.
Lt Gen Richard
Shirreff told the Inquiry that he thought the ability to see
and
identify
indirect fire threats and strike them quickly was “the critical
problem” that UK
forces
faced in Iraq.608
He said
that that required “a series of capabilities which we
simply
didn’t
have”.
605
Minute
Smith to PS/Min(AF), 16 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Countering Indirect
Fire Attacks’.
606
Report
Everard to PJHQ – J3, 15 December 2006, ‘HQ 20 Armd Bde Op TELIC 8
Post Operational
Tour Report’.
607
Report
Shirreff to PSO/CDS, 19 January 2007, ‘Post Operational Report –
Operation TELIC’.
608
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 35‑36.
196