3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
821.
In the
subsequent discussion, the points made included:
•
Dr Blix’s
report could be interpreted as an argument that containment
had
worked:
more explanation was required why we could not continue as
before.
•
The onus
was on Saddam Hussein to explain the discrepancies between
the
Iraqi
declaration and a series of unanswered questions: “about 223
missile
motors
imported illegally; the production of VX nerve agent; 6,500
missing
chemical
bombs; 12 newly stored chemical shells; and the refusal to
allow
[Iraqi]
scientists to be interviewed in private” listed by Dr Blix.
Resolution 1441
“demanded
Iraqi co‑operation: it was not for the inspectors to act like
detectives
to find
evidence of Saddam Hussein’s guilt”.
•
The British
public was “supportive of the UN route, but was averse to
being
rushed into
war by pressure from the US”.
•
Military
action could precipitate a humanitarian crisis involving
internecine strife,
the release
of Iraqi WMD or the breakdown of the UN Oil‑for‑Food
programme.
•
The
military build‑up continued and there would be announcements on
the
call‑up of
Reservists and the Royal Air Force contribution.
•
The
importance of reviving the MEPP had to be constantly reinforced
with
the US.
822.
Mr Blair
concluded that Saddam Hussein “had the choice of either
co‑operating
or being
disarmed”. The UN route “should be pursued”. “More time was needed”
to
allow the
inspectors “to do their job properly and to ensure broad
international support”.
American
rhetoric was “weakening the Iraqi regime from within. If military
action was
required we
would need to make clear our commitment to the people of Iraq and
to
managing
the aftermath of hostilities to their benefit. The UN would need to
be involved
in that
process. Military action would be embarked upon only if necessary
to enforce the
will of the
United Nations.”
823.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had been “clear that his role was to pull
the US
into the
right position” on a UN resolution; and that he had later left
Cabinet to take a call
from
President Bush, “from which he returned looking very
worried”.270
824.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush on both 29 and 30 January.
825.
Mr Blair
continued to emphasise that Dr Blix would need time to
report
a pattern
of non‑co‑operation from Iraq before it would be possible to
secure
support for
a second resolution.
270
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
151