16.2 |
Support for injured Service Personnel
and veterans
132.
Mr Ingram
visited Iraq from 30 September to 1 October.92
His Private
Secretary
reported
that three concerns had been raised with Mr Ingram with regard to
“psychiatric
treatment”:
•
There was
an “apparent upward trend (if not surge)” in the number of
people
requiring
support in the second half of six-month tours.
•
The US
provided “significantly more in-theatre welfare/counselling
support” than
the UK
(although the US deployed personnel for longer than the
UK).
•
Personnel
evacuated back to the UK to receive treatment at The Priory
had,
from their
unit’s perspective, been “‘lost’ for weeks at a time”.
133.
Maj Gen Mans
replied to Gen Dannatt on 30 November, advising that:
•
The high
level of psychiatric casualties being referred to the Field
Mental
Health Team
(FMHT) was a positive feature rather than a cause for
concern,
as it
reflected a willingness by personnel to consult the FMHT. The
number of
personnel
evacuated from theatre was lower than might be expected from
the
number of
referrals to the FMHT.
•
The current
system for providing care for personnel evacuated from theatre
with
mental
health problems (treatment at The Priory and/or the MOD’s
Departments
of
Community Mental Health) conformed to psychiatric best practice.
The
recently
activated RMHP would also help.
•
Regarding
commanders’ understanding of and ability to deal with
psychiatric
issues, the
OROSM had recommended that personnel receive stress
management
training at points throughout their career. This
recommendation
had been
partially implemented; full implementation required resources
and
134.
In November,
Mr Derek Twigg, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
for
Defence,
expressed his concern that the MOD was not providing a
“comprehensive
rehabilitation
package” for personnel returning from operations.94
135.
AM Pocock
responded in December.95
He advised
that a forecast that the current
downward
trend in Road Traffic Accidents would stall, and a recent King’s
Centre paper
indicating
an increased tendency towards risk-taking behaviour after
deployment,
both
supported Mr Twigg’s “nagging concern” that the MOD might not be
providing the
support
that personnel (including Regulars, Reservists, formed units,
individuals, and
individuals
who had been medically evacuated) required.
92
Minute
PS/Min(AF) [MOD] to MA/CJO, 4 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Minister (AF)’s
Visit 30 Sept – 1 Oct ’06’.
93
Minute DAG
to CGS, 30 November 2006, ‘Welfare and Aftercare’.
94
Minute
DCDS(Pers) to MA/USoS [MOD], December 2006, ‘Management of
Personnel Returning from
High
Intensity Operations’.
95
Minute
DCDS(Pers) to MA/USoS [MOD], December 2006, ‘Management of
Personnel Returning from
High
Intensity Operations’.
65