The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
346.
Gen Walker
responded to Lt Gen Pigott the same day, stating that he
remained
“uneasy
over Combat ID”.164
He
continued:
“I
understand that we are currently awaiting the formulation of
coherent US policy
… I am
conscious that significant effort has been made at various levels
to press
this issue
with CENTCOM but that, in the main, the bottom up approach has
been
adopted.
Given the operational implication of not developing a coherent
coalition
policy and
the presentational aspects of Combat ID, I believe that we can
no
longer afford
to prevaricate. The issue now needs to be aired at the highest
levels
within CENTCOM.”
347.
Mr Watkins
wrote on Mr Hoon’s copy of the note: “He is right to focus on
the
presentational
risks: this issue was raised in the House on
Wednesday.”165
348.
On
7 January 2003, Mr Hoon was asked in the House of Commons
what lessons
had been
learned from the past to ensure that British forces were equipped
against the
risk of
friendly fire.166
He
replied:
“… we are
engaged in a process of ensuring that combat identification is
dealt with
satisfactorily.
There is no single technical solution to that difficult problem,
but we
will
acquire new equipment that will be available in time for any
potential conflict in
the Gulf …
I can assure the House that British troops will be able to work
alongside
American
forces entirely safely and satisfactorily.”
349.
A junior MOD
officer provided a DCRS official with a Combat ID update on
the
same
day.167
He first
gave an overview of the work being done in NATO’s
development
of a BTID
which set “a basic technical requirement to be able to identify
‘friend’ or
‘unknown’
on the battlefield” and which had been endorsed by eight
countries.
350.
On Iraq, the
officer stated that the Combat ID UOR was “still being scoped”
and
summarised
what the requirement was likely to encompass.
351.
A UOR was
being developed to mirror “ad-hoc” US measures being
considered
for forthcoming
operations:
“The UK has
been anything but dilatory in developing a technological Combat
ID
capability.
We have actually been a leading light in this area. That no
solution is
yet
available anywhere in the world reflects merely the complexity of
achieving
a
satisfactory technical solution to an extremely challenging
requirement. The
complexity
is exacerbated by the need for international consensus on any
solution.
164
Minute CGS
to DCDS(C), 20 December 2002, ‘Combat ID’.
165
Manuscript
comment Watkins on Minute CGS to DCDS(C), 20 December 2002,
‘Combat ID’.
166
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
7 January 2003, columns 23-25.
167
Minute MOD
[junior officer] to DCRS 1, 7 January 2003, ‘Combat
Identification (CID)’.
54