9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
I have only
spoken briefly on local Arabic TV on the first day of the operation
and
confirmed
our confidence in the GoI’s efforts to sustain the rule of law in
Basra.”
876.
A briefing
note of the same date, seen by Mr Brown, reported that poor
intelligence
and bad
planning led to changes in the objectives of the operation
immediately before
877.
By 27 March,
the Iraqi Special Forces had failed to take any of their targets
and
suffered a
number of casualties before retreating. UK forces were on standby
to provide
“emergency
support” but were not deployed. The militias remained “in control
of the
majority of
the city” and attacks on the Basra Operational Command, where Gen
Mohan
and Gen
Jalil were based, were described as “intense”. There were rumours
that the
Iraqi
authorities had entered into discussions with the militia groups
but Prime Minister
Maliki was
reportedly “determined not to do a deal”.
878.
Reports
suggested that the majority of the local population supported the
efforts
by the
Iraqi Government to assert its authority over the city, although
“it remains to be
seen how
long this will endure if the fighting continues”. The two
particular areas of
concern for
MND(SE) were the announcement by the UN Refugee Agency that it
was
suspending
activities in southern Iraq; and secondly, the fact that the number
of locally
employed
civilian staff turning up to work at Basra Air Station had,
understandably, been
reduced dramatically.
879.
The briefing
note reported that the UK had “given considerable support to
the
Iraqis”
including air support, food, medical and logistical support. But
“kinetic” support
had
“necessarily been limited on occasion as requests have fallen
beyond what our
rules of
engagement allow”. The Iraqis were reported to be frustrated at
this “lukewarm”
support,
and the US was concerned:
“General
Petraeus is reportedly of the view that the UK has not been
sufficiently
positive in
supporting the Iraqi operation in the media. Moreover, it has also
been
reported
that Washington has been briefed that the UK has refused to
provide
ground
support of the Iraqis (when as far as we can judge the only two
requests
for such
support were rejected by General Austin). We believe this
perception has
largely
been corrected, but the fact that it seems to have got to a very
high level in
the US
system very quickly perhaps reflects the degree of concern in the
US system
at the way
events are unfolding.”
880.
Brig Free
visited the Basra Operational Command on 27 March to discuss
UK
support for
the Iraqi operation with the Minister for Defence and Gen Mohan,
and later
visited
Prime Minister Maliki with Lt Gen Austin at Basra
Palace.433
432
Briefing
[unattributed], 27 March 2008, ‘The Current Security Situation in
Basra’.
433
Minute Free
to CJO, 27 March 2008, ‘MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 27 March
2008’.
343