14.2 | Conclusions: Military equipment (post‑conflict)

The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) defined the military capabilities needed by the

Armed Forces. It concluded that the UK needed a more effective expeditionary capability,

including “deployable and mobile” forces, with “sufficient protection and firepower for

war‑fighting”.1 As a result, the MOD established a requirement for a family of vehicles

to replace existing medium weight armoured vehicles. That was to be delivered through

the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) programme which was expected to be in service

towards 2010.

The 1998 SDR also emphasised the importance of developing an enhanced Intelligence,

Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability.

In 2002, the MOD published The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter; an update

on the SDR’s progress and a consideration of the “UK’s defence posture and plans” in

light of the 9/11 attacks.2 A New Chapter again stressed the importance of ISTAR assets:

the MOD would accelerate the Watchkeeper programme which was designed to deliver

an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). That capability was expected in “2005‑06”.3 There

were very few similar capabilities that could be deployed in the interim. By 2003, the

expeditionary capability defined by the 1998 SDR was not yet in place.

A number of witnesses suggested to the Inquiry that the MOD had not been given the

resources to acquire the full range of capabilities specified by the SDR. The Inquiry

has not reached a view on that point. Decisions made by the MOD on the balance

of investment between immediate operational requirements and future defence

programmes in delivering the capabilities set out in the SDR fall outside the Inquiry’s

Terms of Reference.

3. By the end of April 2003, barely a month after the invasion, UK forces began to face a

threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). In July and August, more sophisticated

devices were being used with increasing frequency against Coalition Forces.

4. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) predicted that the IED threat was likely to

increase and continue to evolve rapidly. That was clearly indicated in its Assessments

of 3 September 2003, 25 September 2003 and 5 November 2003.

5. On 1 September, a Forces and Resources Review reported that the IED threat was

being “countered by the use of stripped‑down Land Rovers with top cover sentries”.4

It recommended that protection would be improved by the deployment of armoured

4x4 vehicles.

1 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, July 1998.

2 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, July 2002.

3 Third Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2003‑04, Lessons of Iraq,

HC 57‑I, para 235.

4 Paper MND(SE) [junior officer], 1 September 2003, ‘HQ MND(SE) Forces and Resources Review’.

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