3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
543.
In an
interview with BBC
Newsnight on 14 March,
Mr de Villepin asked what game
was being
played and whether there was a search for a “scapegoat in order to
accuse
one country
of being irresponsible”.181
He stated
that: “We should present the real
position of
both countries.”
544.
Mr de
Villepin pointed out that “no country … had shown any support” for
the UK
proposals
tabled in the Security Council late on 12 March.
545.
In a
conversation with President Bush about the French position and
what
to say when
the resolution was pulled, Mr Blair proposed that they would
need to
show that
France would not authorise the use of force in any
circumstances.
546.
When
Mr Blair and President Bush spoke on 14 March they discussed
the French
position
and what to say about the French position when the decision was
taken to pull
547.
Mr Blair
stated that:
“… we would
need to do so as the reasonable party, showing that France would
not
authorise
the use of force in any circumstances, and demonstrating that we
were
sticking to
1441.”
548.
Mr Blair
said that at some point we needed to set out our views
on
post-conflict,
including humanitarian issues; a joint statement at the Azores
Summit
would
be welcome.
“Bush said
he was predicting a ‘landslide, baby!’
“TB said it
was too close to call.
“Bush … The
Azores was on.
“TB said we
had to be seen striving all the way even if we felt the French
made
it impossible.
“Bush said
it was a ‘moment of truth’ meeting …
“TB said we
must not let it be built up as a council of war. The more we talk
about
the UN and
the aftermath the better …
181
Embassy of
the Republic of France in the UK, Interview
given by M. Dominique de Villepin, Minister of
Foreign
Affairs, to BBC Newsnight, Paris 14.03.2003.
182
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 14 March’.
493