12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
•
Intelligence –
the NIIA should be “running successfully” by early 2009. It
was
currently
“still in its infancy and was heavily dependent on British
assistance”.
One UK
police officer oversaw the entire programme.
•
Capacity‑building
at the MOI – the UK would continue to provide Rule of
Law
and
policing advice at a strategic level to the MOI through one or more
high‑level
advisors.
•
CPATT slots –
to continue “for as long as is required”. British officers held
two
positions
in CPATT and a further two were desired over the next
year.
•
Hostage
affairs – one officer whose role was to provide links into
the
Hostage Working
Group and other US and MNF‑I hostage recovery groups.
It
was a post
that the UK could not “manage without” and any departing
officer
should be
replaced “as rapidly as possible with another police officer from
the
UK with the
relevant skill set”. The role was described as “not a heavily
loaded
slot until
hostage issues arise (as at present),1015
when it
involves long hours and
a heavy
workload”.
•
Chief Police
Adviser – recommended that that role be returned to
Baghdad
following
the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control in Basra “to oversee
what
should be a
smaller and more strategic policing team”. His role could double
up
with a
senior role in CPATT.
1093.
Lt
Gen Houghton described the focus on IMOD development (compared
with the
focus on
the Ministry of Oil) in his 8 January 2006 weekly report to
Gen Walker:
“A
coalition engagement plan that has 103 advisers in the MOD yet only
six in the
Ministry of
Oil is not properly balanced.”1016
1094.
Mr Straw
asked FCO officials for advice on Lt Gen Houghton’s comments
on the
imbalance
between coalition support for the Ministries of Defence and
Oil.1017
1095.
Mr Asquith
replied to Mr Straw on 18 January.1018
He advised
that the IMOD had
indeed
received a “disproportionately” larger number of advisers than
other ministries,
for three
reasons:
•
unlike
other ministries, the IMOD had been torn apart by the coalition
and
needed
rebuilding from scratch;
•
the
importance of security issues; and
•
its
location in the Green Zone, which meant that advisers could work
there
relatively
uninterrupted.
1015
This may be
a reference to the kidnapping of up to 150 employees and visitors
of an Education
Ministry
building in Baghdad.
1016
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 8 January 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (194) 08
January 06’.
1017
Minute
Asquith to Foreign Secretary, 18 January 2006, ‘Iraq:
Capacity‑building in Ministries’.
1018
Minute
Asquith to Foreign Secretary, 18 January 2006, ‘Iraq:
Capacity‑building in Ministries’.
309