The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
342.
Officials
reviewed the situation against contingencies that would trigger a
reduction
in the
numbers of staff exposed to the threat:
“In
Baghdad: a deterioration in security within the International Zone;
a redrawing
of its
perimeter to place the Embassy at its edge …; an increase of
accurate strikes
from
rockets or mortars; loss of control of the airport road; or a CBW
threat.
“In Basra:
use of SAMS [surface‑to‑air missiles] in a manner that removed
the
scope for
evacuation by air; an increase of accurate mortar or rocket
strikes; more
sophisticated
attacks on vehicles; or a CBW threat.”
343.
Officials
concluded that, in Basra, a rocket attack on the British Embassy
Office
had
triggered one of the contingencies. In consultation with other
departments, the FCO
had
initiated a limited withdrawal of less essential staff and DFID had
postponed several
new
deployments, largely because proposed work in the governorates was
not possible
in current
circumstances.
344.
Officials
reported that, in Baghdad, the contingencies had not been
triggered, but
the Embassy
was reviewing staffing levels. DFID had reviewed its staffing in
Baghdad
and planned
a net reduction of six consultancy posts. Some work would be
based
outside
Iraq with shorter visits to Baghdad, but core work with the Iraqi
Prime Minister’s
Office and
on economic reform and support to civil society would not be
affected.
345.
An easing of
the security situation in Basra during November came to an
end
with a
rocket attack on the Basra Palace site on 4
December.240
Mr Collis
reported that
staff had
reverted to carrying body armour when moving outside after dark,
but that the
Consulate
Club, which had been housed in a portakabin, had reopened in a
hardened
location on
5 December.
346.
Further low
intensity and inaccurate attacks continued throughout
December.241
347.
During 2004
and 2005, UK civilian personnel in Iraq became
increasingly
dependent
on military assets for transport between and within Baghdad and
Basra.
348.
On 27 November
2004, after a series of attacks on the road to Baghdad
Airport,
the US
Embassy announced the suspension all road travel to the airport by
civilian
staff.242
Until
further notice, they would travel by helicopter.
349.
Mr Chaplin
advised the FCO that the removal of US civilian vehicles from
the
airport
road would raise the threat to UK road travel to an unacceptable
level. US
helicopters
had no spare capacity and UK helicopters were committed to
military
operations.
For the Embassy’s operations to be sustainable, it needed its
own
helicopter assets.
240
Telegram
214 Basra to FCO London, 6 December 2004, ‘Iraq: Attack on Basra
Palace Site’.
241
Telegram
227 Basra to FCO London, 23 December 2004, ‘Iraq: Stand Off Attack
on Basra Palace Site’.
242
Telegram
430 Baghdad to FCO London, 29 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Suspension of
Road Moves to
Baghdad
Airport’.
304