The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Establishing the objectives of a UN resolution

474.  Questions emerged in Washington shortly after the meeting at Camp David

about whether Mr Blair regarded intrusive inspections as a necessary first stage

in the plan.

475.  In discussions with Secretary Powell about the strategy, Mr Straw raised

doubts about the plan to seek authority for the use of military force in a

second resolution.

476.  Letters from Sir Christopher Meyer149 and Mr Brenton150 on 9 September reported

suggestions in the US Administration that Mr Blair had indicated at Camp David that

he would be willing to move straight to a resolution that sought approval to use “all

necessary means” in response to Iraq’s existing material breaches of its obligations

without a resolution strengthening the inspection regime first. The UK was being asked

to make sure that the White House correctly understood its position and, in particular,

whether the UK regarded intrusive inspections as a necessary first stage in the plan.

477.  Mr Straw spoke twice to Secretary Powell on 9 September.151

478.  In the first conversation they discussed the issue of whether to go for one or two

resolutions. The record stated that both were concerned to preserve what they described

as “the Kosovo option”; and that Mr Straw thought that that “would require only one

resolution as long as it contained a fig leaf for military action. We should not commit to a

second resolution, although that option could be kept open.”

479.  Mr Straw and Secretary Powell also agreed that no public document could produce

an incontrovertible case for military action; the focus had to be on compliance with

UN resolutions.

480.  In the second conversation, Mr Straw had “confirmed ‘100%’ that a UNSCR was

a key part of the strategy discussed between” Mr Blair and President Bush, and that

President Bush had “made clear he did not regard military action as the first option”.

481.  Secretary Powell and Mr Straw discussed the latest position in a telephone

conversation on 10 September.152 US thinking, influenced by Mr Blair at Camp David,

was that the provision for the use of “all necessary means” against Iraq should be put in

the second resolution. Mr Straw said that he was:

“… in two minds. He was searching for what would work best. If we could get what

was needed in the first resolution, it would be good to have it in the bank. He was

149 Letter Meyer to Manning, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

150 Letter Brenton to Manning, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

151 Letter Sedwill to Manning, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversations with

Colin Powell, 9 September’.

152 Telegram 1615 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 10 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s

conversation with US Secretary of State, 10 September’.

174