1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
41.
Mr Goulty sent
a revised paper, entitled ‘Iraq: Options Paper’, to Mr McKane
on
42.
The paper
stated that sanctions were “fraying at the edges”. Since the breach
of
the embargo
on civilian flights on 22 September, over 40 civilian flights had
landed in
Baghdad
“signalling to some the end of Saddam’s isolation”. Saddam
Hussein’s income
from
“sanctions busting” was “an all-time high” of around US$1.5bn a
year. Saddam
believed
that the situation was developing in his favour and was under no
immediate
pressure to
resume co-operation with the UN.
43.
The paper
considered the advantages and disadvantages of seven policy
options:
•
regime
overthrow by supporting external and internal Iraqi opposition
groups;
•
“Hard”
containment;
•
continuing
with the present policy;
•
“Soft”
containment (a range of possibilities such as suspending sanctions
and
abandoning
the southern NFZ);
•
lifting
sanctions (except those relating to arms and WMD);
•
lifting
sanctions plus regime overthrow by supporting external and internal
Iraqi
opposition
groups; and
•
“Military
action/lift sanctions”; the US and UK would conduct a
bombing
campaign,
“declare that this has achieved our disarmament objectives”, then
lift
sanctions.
44.
Mr Goulty
advised that the paper contained no conclusions, given its
primary
purpose of
providing background for discussions with the US.
45.
The Cabinet
Office chaired a meeting to discuss the revised
paper.34
Summarising
the main
points of the discussion in a letter to Mr Goulty, Mr McKane stated
that, with
regard to
Iraqi WMD:
“Our
current objective is to eliminate Saddam’s existing capabilities,
and constrain
his ability
to reconstitute them. Although this appears anomalous in the
context of
our
approach to other proliferators in the region, Iraq merits special
treatment both
because of
its proven willingness to use WMD, and because of the requirement
that
the UN has
placed upon it. This is the answer to the accusation of double
standards.
…
“If UNMOVIC
ever gets back into Iraq, that will not be the end of the story.
If
UNMOVIC
does its job properly, Iraq will presumably try to obstruct it and
sooner or
later there
will be an UNSCOM-style [UN Special Commission] confrontation.
Unless
we want to
leave Saddam’s finger on the trigger, we should not regard UNMOVIC
as
a long-term
solution.”
33
Letter
Goulty to McKane, 15 November 2000, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper,
[undated], ‘Iraq: Options Paper’.
34
Letter
McKane to Goulty, 20 November 2000, ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
199