The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
171.
Where the UK
is the junior partner and is unable during planning or
implementation
to secure
the outcome it requires, it should take stock of whether to attach
conditions
to
continued participation and whether further involvement would be
consistent with the
UK’s
strategic interest.
172.
Public
statements on the extent of the UK’s ambition should reflect a
realistic
assessment
of what is achievable. To do otherwise is to risk even greater
disillusionment
and a loss
of UK credibility.
173.
Departmental
priorities and interests will inevitably continue to diverge even
where
an
inter‑departmental body with a cross‑government role, currently the
SU, is in place.
Therefore,
co‑operation between departments needs continual reinforcement at
official
and
Ministerial levels.
174.
The Head of
the SU must be sufficiently senior and the SU enjoy
recognition
inside and
outside government as a centre of excellence in its field if the
Unit is to have
credibility
and influence in No.10, the National Security Council, the
Treasury, the FCO,
DFID and
the MOD, and with the military.
175.
Section 9.8
sets out the Inquiry’s conclusions and lessons on
strategy‑making.
556