The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

768. A draft ‘UK Iraq Strategy’ was circulated to members of the AHMGIR for comment

on 26 September.428

769. The final version was issued to members of the AHMGIR by the Cabinet Office

on 8 October after “those Private Offices who responded indicated their Ministers’

endorsement”.

770. Sir Nigel Sheinwald annotated his copy: “I don’t see a need for PM [Mr Blair]

to see this”.429

771. The Strategy acknowledged the CPA Strategy published in July 2003 and

stated that this was a longer-term UK Strategy for Iraq that was broadly consistent

with the CPA Strategy, but which set the framework for specific UK activities towards

a common objective.430

772. The Strategy identified the UK objective as:

“Iraq to become a stable, united and law-abiding state, within its present borders,

co-operating within the international community, no longer posing a threat to its

neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and

providing effective representative government, sustainable economic growth and

rising living standards to its entire people.”

773. The Strategy stated that:

• Successful reconstruction required the “widest possible” international support.

Getting the UN and IFIs engaged would increase the chances of securing that

support.

• The US had far greater resources than the UK, but UK influence over US policy

was limited and the UK’s approach would be “vulnerable to shifts in US thinking”.

• The UK was active at a national level, but UK assets were concentrated in the

South where the UK was most exposed to the consequences of failure.

• There were few quick fixes for essential services. Improvement would

require multi-year projects “even beyond the scope of the CPA if it receives

US$20bn from Congress”. Nevertheless, the UK needed to demonstrate

some visible progress in improving living standards in order to maintain local

consent. For the UK in CPA(South), that would require more funding and more

skilled personnel.

428 Minute Dodd to Sheinwald, 8 October 2003, ‘UK Iraq Strategy’ attaching Paper Cabinet Office,

7 October 2003, ‘UK Iraq Strategy Paper’.

429 Manuscript comment Sheinwald on Minute Dodd to Sheinwald, 8 October 2003, ‘UK Iraq Strategy’.

430 Paper Cabinet Office, 7 October 2003, ‘UK Iraq Strategy Paper’.

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