The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
new
capability in weapons of mass destruction”. Iraq “had to comply”
with its
obligations
to the UN.
140.
The record of
the meeting held by Mr John Scarlett, Chairman of the
Joint
Intelligence
Committee (JIC), at 1pm on 20 September (see Section 4.2)
stated that
copies of
the dossier would be made available for Cabinet on 23
September.44
141.
Cabinet met at
5pm on 23 September. The minutes record only brief
updates
by Mr Blair
and Mr Straw.45
142.
Opening the
discussion, Mr Blair told his colleagues that:
“… the
dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction would show that the
policy
of
containment had worked up to a point, but that Saddam Hussein …
continued
to rebuild
his programme to acquire such weapons. The evidence showed his
efforts
to procure
equipment and materials, and to restore production facilities. This
was
an issue
for the United Nations, with whose Security Council resolutions
Iraq had
not complied.
A new resolution was being negotiated.”
“It was the
threat of military action which had caused Saddam Hussein
recently
to invite
United Nations inspectors back into Iraq. Only if inspections were
thwarted
again would
the question of military action arise. Meanwhile, pressure had to
be
maintained
… We were not at the point of authorising military action
now.”
“In
presenting the case to Parliament … he intended also to stress our
commitment
to
rebuilding Afghanistan and making progress towards solving the
Israel/Palestine
problem.”
145.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet that “the climate of opinion had changed”. Since
President
Bush’s
speech to the UN on 12 September:
“Responsibility
for dealing with Iraq’s non‑compliance had been placed with
the
United
Nations. To achieve a peaceful outcome a tightly worded Security
Council
resolution
was required and maximum support, including for the threat of the
use
of force.”
146.
Mr Straw
added that “the nature of the motion to be put before Parliament if
military
action
became necessary would require consideration”.
44
Minute
[Cabinet Office] to Rycroft and others, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Dossier: Public Handling
and Briefing’.
45
Cabinet
Conclusions, 23 September 2002.
222