The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

374. There is no indication in the No.10 papers sent to the Inquiry of a response

from Mr Blair.

375. Sir David Manning wrote on 2 April: “Not to issue at present.”164

376. A revised draft paper on Iraqi WMD programmes was produced on 20 March,

explicitly stating that Iraq was in breach of UN Security Council resolutions and

giving more prominence to its strategies for concealment.

377. Mr Miller sent the draft paper, which was “very much as you have seen it before”,

to the US Embassy asking for “final comments”.165

378. Mr Miller also wrote to Sir Richard Dearlove, Sir Francis Richards (Director

of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)) and AM French with a

similar request.166

379. The Introduction of the draft paper had been revised to place the UK’s concerns

in the context of the failure of a few countries to sign the NPT, the CWC and BTWC or a

decision, if they had signed, “to break them”.167

380. The Introduction focused on Iraq’s failure to comply with the NPT, its previous use

of chemical weapons, and its failure to comply with relevant UN resolutions adopted

since the 1991 Gulf Conflict. It also stated:

“The International Community has repeatedly sought to disrupt Iraq’s efforts to

acquire WMD. On each occasion Saddam has sought to rebuild his capabilities.

His efforts are making progress. The Government monitors these efforts very

closely. This paper sets out what the Government is able to say about them.”

381. The Introduction remained unchanged in all subsequent versions of the document

produced before September.

382. Other changes in the draft paper included:

• An acknowledgement that Iraq’s nuclear weapons infrastructure had been

dismantled by the IAEA, but the addition of a judgement that Iraq was “still

working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability”. That was in breach of its NPT

and IAEA obligations, and resolution 687 (1991).

• A reference to Iraq’s obligation under resolution 707 (1991) to “cease all nuclear

activities of any kind other than the civil use of isotopes”.

164 Manuscript comment Manning, 2 April 2002, on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 20 March 2002,

‘Iraq’.

165 Letter Miller to US Embassy, London, 20 March 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes’.

166 Letter Miller to C and others, 20 March 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes’.

167 Letter Miller to C and others, 20 March 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes’ attaching Paper Assessments

Staff, [undated], ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes’.

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