The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

154. Mr Miller sent “a short note on Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile capability”,

which drew “heavily” on the JIC Assessment of 10 May, to JIC members on

30 November 2001.78

155. Mr Miller described the main points as:

• Iraq “probably has a capability to target a limited number of ballistic missiles

against other countries in the Middle East and Gulf regions, particularly Israel”.

• It was “possible that such missiles could be armed with chemical or biological

warheads, although other conventional options for these weapons, such as

aircraft or artillery, are available”.

• While Iraq was “judged unlikely to be able to acquire any nuclear capability

in the short term”, the “construction of a radiological dispersal device” was

“technically possible”.

156. The UK Government has been unable to find a copy of the note Mr Miller

provided.79

157. The FCO perspective on Iraq’s WMD capabilities and intentions was set out in

a letter from Mr Simon McDonald, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary, to No.10 on

3 December in response to a request from Mr Blair for a note on options for dealing with

Iraq (see Section 3.1).80

158. The letter stated:

“There is real reason for concern about Iraq’s WMD programmes, principally CBW

and long range missiles. There is evidence of continuing Iraqi attempts to procure

nuclear-related materiel. Saddam’s history of aggression and use of CW sets Iraq

apart from other WMD-armed states.”

159. In an Annex addressing Iraq’s response to its obligations, the FCO stated that

Iraq was:

“(a) concealing information about large quantities of chemical and biological

munitions, agents and precursors. UNSCOM inspectors were unable to account

for [material related to chemical weapons] and very large quantities of growth media

acquired, on Iraq’s own admission, for the production of biological weapons;

(b) concealing up to 20 long-range Al Hussein missiles;

(c) actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles.

The missile-related facilities damaged by Operation Desert Fox in 1998 have been

repaired, research continues and new facilities are being constructed. Other former

78 Minute Miller to Wright, 30 November 2001, ‘Iraqi WMD capability in the event of a US attack’.

79 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 22 July 2015, ‘Declassification – 3.3-MA’.

80 Letter McDonald to Tatham, 3 December 2001, ‘Iraq: Options’.

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