The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
294.
UK
officials continued to work on a draft resolution (known informally
as the
“Smart
Sanctions” resolution) to reflect the new policy framework, based
on a
new Goods
Review List.
295.
The UK
prepared a draft resolution for the P5 Political Directors meeting
in New
York on 21
May.154
The UK
intended that the draft resolution would:
•
allow the
export to Iraq of all goods other than WMD and military items
through
fast-track
procedures;
•
introduce
more tightly focused controls on “Iraq weapons” through
agreement
on a
“Controlled Goods List” of arms and items of WMD concern: the UK
was
pressing
the US not to insist on an “unreasonably long list”;
•
through
agreement with Iraq’s neighbours, bring Iraq’s illegal oil exports
within
the OFF
programme; and
•
introduce
strengthened monitoring of Iraq’s land, sea and air
borders.
296.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Inquiry that:
“The
Council remained deeply divided between those states which remained
highly
suspicious
of Iraqi activity, with intelligence showing evidence of continued
Iraqi
interest in
materials for sophisticated weapons programmes (the US, the UK
and
one or two
other western or western-oriented members of the Security Council),
and
Russia,
France, China and many developing world or middle-ground members
of
the
Council, who opposed the continuation of sanctions short of
convincing evidence
that Iraq
was continuing to breach Security Council resolutions in a way
which
threatened
international peace and security.”155
297.
It proved
impossible to reach agreement in the Security Council by
the
deadline of
4 June.
298.
Mr Sawers
advised Mr Blair at the end of May that there remained “big
arguments
ahead” on
the detail of any new arrangement, within the US Administration,
the P5 and
the
region.156
It would be
surprising if an agreement could be reached in the
Security
Council by
early June. Mr Sawers asked: “Do you anyway want this to come to a
head in
late
May/early June? Wouldn’t it be better to let it slip a month or
two?”157
299.
Mr Sawers also
reported that there was a difference of view between Mr Cook
and
the MOD on
the utility of the NFZs, and suggested asking the MOD for a
considered
view on the
alternatives.
154
Minute
Tanfield to Goulty, 18 May 2001, ‘Iraq Policy Review: Draft
Rollover Resolution’.
155
Statement,
27 November 2009, pages 2-3.
156
Note Sawers
to Prime Minister, [undated], [untitled].
157 As
the June 2001 UK General Election would have prevented UK Ministers
from taking an active role in
lobbying
for the change.
248