The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
82.
In a meeting
in New York on 22 April, Mr Bolton told Sir Jeremy
Greenstock,
UK Permanent
Representative to the UN, that “the US did not disagree with
credible
inspections
and getting WMD finds into the public domain”.40
But it
was:
“…
concerned about involving UNMOVIC too soon or too extensively …
The
UNMOVIC
issue should be left on the backburner – it would become less of
a
problem as
the Coalition made discoveries.”
83.
Sir Jeremy
replied that the UK was “less neuralgic” than the US about
involving
UNMOVIC,
but would “not force the issue”. The UK wanted to ensure that there
were
“credible
arrangements that left no doubt over Coalition discoveries”. He
also said that:
“US
reluctance would be seen as a general reluctance to have the UN
involved
in
post-conflict Iraq (this was manageable). We had not identified any
credible
alternatives
… [I]f international verification emerged strengthened from the
Iraq issue
it could be
used in other cases.”
84.
The Security
Council discussed UNMOVIC on 22 April.41
85.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock described the discussion as “subdued”. He reported
that
Dr Blix
told the Security Council that it was evident that civilian
inspections could
not operate
in Iraq. In addition, some of the assumptions on which the Council
had
established
UNMOVIC had changed, and it was entirely natural that the Coalition
should
establish
units to search for WMD.
86.
The draft
UNMOVIC work programme could be adapted to assume that
UNMOVIC
would:
•
verify and
corroborate Coalition findings;
•
continue to
supervise destruction of WMD; and
•
carry out
longer-term monitoring.
87.
Sir Jeremy
reported that almost all members of the Security Council
accepted
the need
for UNMOVIC to return to Iraq and most highlighted the link with
the lifting
of
sanctions, but none pressed the US hard. The IAEA representative
reported that
Dr ElBaradei’s
view was that the IAEA should resume inspections as soon as
possible;
it was
the only body with legal powers to verify nuclear
disarmament.
88.
Sir Jeremy
told the Security Council that the UK saw a role for UNMOVIC
and
the IAEA in
verifying disarmament and long-term monitoring. He added that
Coalition
Forces were
“fully aware of the need to be active, professional, and to treat
all relevant
40
Telegram
705 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
UNMOVIC: 22 April’.
41
Telegram
705 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
UNMOVIC: 22 April’.
442