The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
brigade
should be able to manage a single, well-populated province” the
size
of Basra,
but there were four options available:
{{a
brigade responsible for security in a single province;
{{a UK
divisional headquarters could take responsibility for security,
under
Coalition
command, in a wider area of Iraq (US planners envisaged
Basra,
Maysan, Dhi
Qar and Wasit being a single sector), supported by
Coalition
partners,
which, the paper recognised, could be difficult to
find;
{{deployment of
the ARRC in addition or as an alternative to a brigade;
or
{{withdrawal of
all forces in the medium term, although it was warned
that
would be
politically difficult.
•
Whether to
follow the US plan, which had to be right, to administer Iraq
as
a whole and
not seek general UK responsibility for the administration
of
any
geographic area in the medium term. In any area where the UK
took
responsibility
for security, it could, with a UN mandate, also take on
wider
responsibility
for reconstruction (including humanitarian assistance and
aspects
of civil
administration), but that would “very likely be beyond the
resources of
the UK
alone and have implications for domestic Departments”.
532.
MOD advice
to Mr Hoon was explicit about the inadequacy of those
preparations.
533.
The MOD
briefing for Mr Hoon stated:
“… any UK
involvement in the administration of post-conflict Iraq will
necessarily
require a
significant civilian administrative and specialist component; this
component
has not yet
been identified or resourced by OGDs. This is the
key issue.
The success
of civil administration will be essential to Iraq’s long term
future.
The UK
military cannot do this on their own.
“… [T]he
current Defence Planning Assumption is that UK forces can only
sustain
large scale
operations for a period of six months without doing long term
damage
to
capability. This implies that UK forces reduce to a medium scale
(i.e. roughly one
brigade)
post-conflict TELIC commitment.
“… US
planning is currently tending to assume UK involvement in Phase IV
at a
level that
is the maximum, if not higher than, that we can sustain.
If
Ministers wish
to set
limits on the UK’s Phase IV contribution they should be set now so
that
US planning
can be adjusted …
“… [A]s US
planning stands, the UK will need substantial support from other
nations.
There are
no arrangements yet in place formally to gather such support.
Such
support
will be largely contingent on a suitable
second/third
UNSCR and a UN
mandate for
the occupation of Iraq. The FCO need to build on their recent
‘market
468