3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
land
operations while further ground forces built up to overwhelm Iraqi
forces; “leading
to the
collapse of the Iraqi regime”. A “Generated Start” following a
military build-up
could begin
as early as January 2003. This was also judged to be the latest
date for the
start of
military operations unless action was “deferred until the following
autumn”.
242.
The “UK’s
ability to contribute forces depended on the details of US
military
planning
and the time available to prepare and deploy them”. The MOD was
“examining
how the UK
might contribute to US-led action”. Options ranging from deployment
of a
division to
making bases available had been identified. US plans assumed the
use of
British
bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. Unless “publicly visible”
decisions were taken
“very soon”
the UK would not be able to send a division in time for an
operation in Iraq
in January
2003.
243.
A “decision in
principle” might be “needed soon on whether and in what form
the
UK takes
part in military action”.
244.
Ministers were
invited to “note the potentially long lead times involved in
equipping
UK Armed
Forces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre”; and to “agree
that MOD
should
bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operational
Requirements
[UORs]
under cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan” and the
“outcome” of the
2002
Spending Review.
245.
The planning
and preparations for equipping UK forces are addressed
in
Section 6.3.
246.
Mr McKane
advised Sir David Manning separately that the Cabinet Office
paper
covered US
military plans “only in headline form” on the grounds that Mr Blair
would
“wish to
receive a short oral brief from CDS”.108
247.
Regime
change was “not a proper basis for international action” but it
could
“result
from action which is otherwise lawful”.
248.
The UN and
the international community needed to be persuaded to
“set a
deadline,
leading to an ultimatum”.
249.
Reflecting
the JIC Assessment of 27 February, the paper stated that
Saddam
Hussein was
“likely to admit weapons inspectors as a means of
forestalling”
military
action.
250.
It would
take “at least six months” after entering Iraq for the
inspectors
to establish
a monitoring and verification system.
251.
Addressing the
basis on which military action might be justified, the Cabinet
Office
paper
explained that the US and UK views of international law varied.
While “regime
108
Minute
McKane to Manning, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
45