The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
202.
The JIC added
that Iraq:
“… could
begin to make chemical weapons within a matter of weeks, and
produce
significant
quantities within months, if UN constraints were
removed.”
203.
In relation to
biological weapons, the JIC noted:
“We have
convincing intelligence of a BW programme which started in the
1970s
and strong
indications that it produced and weaponised anthrax, botulinum
toxin,
and
probably plague. With the exception of plague, Iraq previously
admitted doing
research on
these and other agents but steadfastly denied the work was for
an
offensive
programme. UNSCOM, although suspicious, could find no clear
evidence
to the
contrary … [I]n August 1995 Iraq admitted to a major BW
programme
under which
it had produced huge quantities of anthrax and botulinum toxin,
but
implausibly
denied it had ever considered weaponisation … In the last few days
Iraq
has
admitted to UNSCOM that agent was produced at additional sites,
field-testing
of weapons
took place in 1989, and that bombs and missile warheads were
filled
with
anthrax and botulinum toxin in December 1990 … Many questions
remain on
the BW
programme; Iraq has not, for example admitted any work on
plague.”95
204.
After Lt Gen
Kamil’s defection, concerns began to grow that Iraq had a
systematic
programme
of concealment.
205.
UNSCOM
reported that Iraq’s FFCD on ballistic missiles in November 1995
did
not appear
to constitute a firm basis for establishing a definite and
verifiable material
balance for
proscribed weapons and activities.96
206.
From early
1996, UNSCOM undertook a series of inspections specifically
targeting
sites it
“believed to be associated with concealment activities” in response
to Iraq’s
assertion
that “there was no systematic mechanism for
concealment”.97
207.
While Iraq
complied with its obligations in respect of most inspections,
UNSCOM
reported
encountering difficulties and delays on five occasions in March
1996 when it
requested
no-notice inspections of sites related to Iraq’s missile
programmes, and that
Iraq had
also imposed restrictions on aerial surveillance.98
95
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
134.
96
UN Security
Council, 17 December 1995, ‘Tenth report of the Executive
Chairman of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of Security Council
resolution
687 (1991), and paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991) on the
activities of the Special
Commission’
(S/1995/1038).
97
UN Security
Council, 11 October 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/848).
98
UN Security
Council, 11 April 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/258).
60