The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
e. UK
commitment – For how long, and to what extent, will the UK be a
significant
contributor
to AM operations?”
1011.
On governance
and reform, the paper stated:
•
Detailed
military planning was proceeding with no clear view on the future
of the
Iraqi
state. The UK had a valuable contribution to make to development of
an
overarching
concept, “but the lead must rest firmly with the US as the only
nation
with
sufficient resources to underwrite the task”.
•
There was
considerable temptation for regional powers to develop
bilateral
relations
with different ethnic groups, potentially leading to the
“Balkanisation” of
Iraq and a
protracted role for Coalition forces.
•
UK and US
positions on the role of the UN were getting closer, but
remained
divided.
For political and military reasons the UK must continue to stress
the
need to
maximise UN and international involvement.
1012.
The most
significant factor in determining the scale and complexity of the
post-
conflict
task, the situation in Iraq, was also the least predictable. It was
not possible “to
truly
assess the state of Iraq and the intent of its principal actors in
the AM phase until
we are
presented with them”. The UK’s strategy therefore needed to be
flexible enough
to respond
to the situation on the ground. In order to make the task of
scoping different
scenarios
possible, the UK needed to form an early view on where it wished to
operate.
The initial
location might be driven by the UK’s role in Phase III, “but we can
shape this”.
To do that,
three factors needed to be considered:
“a.
Political – FCO:
What areas
offer the UK an advantageous or influential role in the AM
phase?
Are oil
fields a factor? Are there groups … whom we would rather not
assume
responsibility
for? A reasoned policy view is required.
b. Military
– MOD:
Where will
our Phase III role place us and do we wish to shape it according
to
AM factors
in any way? Are there areas where we judge there is a high
risk
of failure?
Are there areas where UK strengths will be most effective, such
as
population
centres? What size and nature of area can the UK force
deployed
realistically
assume responsibility for?
c.
Humanitarian
– DFID:
What are
the most significant areas of humanitarian risk? How will DFID
engage
and how can
we effectively co-ordinate our efforts? How can we apply our
limited
military
capacity to respond to best effect?
“This
thought process must be undertaken urgently if we are to shape our
Phase
III role
accordingly. Currently our involvement in the North or South is
being driven
284