The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
vacuum
which Allied forces did not have the capacity to fill but also
resulted
in
alienation of the former army. This actively contributed to
deterioration in
security,
hampered political progress and was a factor leading to the
subsequent
insurgency …”
973.
In 2014/15,
the SU was based in the FCO and jointly owned by the FCO, MOD
and
DFID.618
It used
DFID financial and risk management systems and had a DFID
Senior
Responsible
Officer.
974.
The SU’s
2014/15 Business Plan explained that the Unit had an operational
role
across all
three pillars of the BSOS:
•
early
warning;
•
rapid
crisis prevention and response; and
•
investing
in upstream prevention.619
975.
The SU’s
contribution included:
•
being the
hub for Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability
(JACS);
•
supporting
the UK National Security Council (NSC) by facilitating
development
of
cross-government strategies for fragile and conflict-affected
states;
•
providing
high-quality advice on the design and implementation of
programmes
funded by
the Conflict Pool/Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
(CSSF);620
•
supporting
the development of monitoring and evaluation guidance;
•
capturing
and disseminating lessons learned;
•
maintaining
the CSG database; and
•
providing a
hub for the Government’s non-operational international
policing
activity.
976.
Witnesses to
the Inquiry gave conflicting evidence on the impact of the
PCRU
and the
SU.
977.
Mr Benn
told the Inquiry:
“I think
the PCRU and now the Stabilisation Unit is a very practical
response to
a need
that has been identified.
618
Stabilisation
Unit, March 2014, ‘Stabilisation Unit Business Plan
2014-15’.
619
Stabilisation
Unit, March 2014, ‘Stabilisation Unit Business Plan
2014-15’.
620
The
Conflict Pool funded UK conflict prevention, stabilisation and
peacekeeping activities in support of
the
Building Stability Overseas Strategy. In April 2015 it was replaced
by the Conflict, Stability and Security
Fund
(CSSF).
524