Executive Summary

759. ACM Stirrup’s acceptance that the “law of diminishing returns” was “now firmly

in play” and that there was “an increasing risk” that UK forces would “become part of

the problem, rather than the solution” had some validity: it was clear from accounts

of the situation in Basra that UK forces were not preventing a steady decline in

security. ACM Stirrup was also right to advise Dr Reid that the MNF in Iraq faced a

“multifaceted”, sophisticated and dangerous enemy; that serious issues remained

in Basra (militia activity, poor governance, insecurity); and that it was possible the

UK would be accused of strategic failure.

760. The established policy was that UK forces would withdraw as the capabilities of

the ISF increased until responsibility could be handed over to the Iraqi Government.

ACM Stirrup’s proposed remedy of continued drawdown and managing public opinion

did not mitigate the risk of strategic failure he described.

761. In the summer of 2006, in recognition of the need to stabilise Basra and prepare

it for transition to Iraqi control, the UK developed the Basra Security Plan, “a plan to

improve Basra through operations, high impact reconstruction and SSR [Security Sector

Reform] ... lasting for up to six months”.267 The military element of the plan became

known as Operation SALAMANCA and included operations against militia groups.

762. In August 2006, ACM Stirrup was asked to give direction on both seeking US help

for Op SALAMANCA and the possibility of deploying UK forces to support US operations

outside MND(SE).

763. While ACM Stirrup stressed the importance of senior Iraqi political support

if Op SALAMANCA was to be a success, Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton,

the Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, indicated a concern that even with

US support the capabilities available in MND(SE) might not be sufficient successfully

to deliver Op SALAMANCA.

764. ACM Stirrup directed that it was acceptable for the UK to make use of US

enablers, such as aviation, in MND(SE), but that, in general, commitments in MND(SE)

were to be met by existing MND(SE) personnel (including contractors) and any shortfalls

were to be identified and considered appropriately.

765. ACM Stirrup also directed that the deployment of UK troops to Multi‑National

Division (Centre South):

“... crossed a clear policy ‘red line’ and seemed counter‑intuitive, given that

consideration was also being given to obtaining US forces for MND(SE). The UK

needed to draw down its force levels as soon as practicable, both in MND(SE)

and elsewhere.”268

267 Minute Burke‑Davies to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 August 2006, ‘Iraq: Op SALAMANCA’.

268 Minutes, 2 August 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

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