The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
83.
As Lord
Goldsmith’s subsequent advice confirmed, whether a specific
failure
to comply
with the requirements placed upon Iraq by the resolution would
amount
to a
material breach would have to be judged in the particular
circumstances of
Iraq’s
response.
84.
On 25
November, the House of Commons debated resolution 1441 (2002) and
the
Government
motion:
“That this
House supports UNSCR 1441 as unanimously adopted by the
UN
Security
Council; agrees that the Government of Iraq must comply fully with
all
provisions
of the resolution; and agrees that, if it fails to do so, the
Security Council
should meet
in order to consider the situation and the need for full
compliance.”17
85.
Mr Straw’s
draft opening statement was sent to No.10 for comment.
Mr Powell
questioned
two points in the text:
•
a statement
that the UK would prefer a second resolution, which
Mr Powell
described
as “not our position up to now”; and
•
that we
didn’t “absolutely need one [a second resolution]”, which
Mr Powell
commented
would “force the Attorney General to break cover”.18
86.
Mr Blair
commented that he did not “see this as such a
problem”.19
87.
In his opening
speech, Mr Straw set out the inspection process and the
answers
to four
“key questions” which arose from the resolution:
•
What
constituted a material breach? Mr Straw referred to operative
paragraph 4
of the
resolution, but went on to say: “As with any definition of that
type, it is
never
possible to give an exhaustive list of all the conceivable
behaviours
that it
covers. That judgement has to be made against the real
circumstances
that arise,
but I reassure the House that material breach means
something
significant:
some behaviour or pattern of behaviour that is serious. Among
such
breaches
could be action by the Government of Iraq seriously to obstruct
or
impede the
inspectors, to intimidate witnesses, or a pattern of behaviour
where
any single
action appears relatively minor but the actions as a whole add up
to
something
deliberate and more significant: something that shows Iraq’s
intention
•
Who would
decide what happened if there was a material breach?
Mr Straw
argued that
if a “material breach” was reported to the Security Council,
“the
decision on
whether there had been a material breach will effectively have
been
17
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 25
November 2002, column 47.
18
Email
Powell to Manning, 23 November 2002, ‘Jack’s Iraq
Statement’.
19
Manuscript
comment Blair on Email Powell to Manning, 23 November 2002, ‘Jack’s
Iraq Statement’.
20
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 25
November 2002, column 51.
18