The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
910.
Lord Turnbull
told the Inquiry:
“There was
one point in which – this is a sort of classic way in which the
Cabinet
Secretary
intervenes, we get to December, I think, and the DFID come to me
for –
I think
invoking my help, saying ‘We are not satisfied that we are learning
enough on
what is
going on in the military planning’, and at the same time Clare
Short raised it
with Lord
Boyce and the Prime Minister and it was very quickly sorted
out.”442
911.
Although
co-operation between DFID and the MOD improved, No.10
continued
to block DFID participation in detailed discussions of military
planning.
912.
Ms Short
was not briefed on UK military planning until 12
February.
913.
At her
request, Dr Brewer met Mr Stephen Pollard, Head of MOD
Overseas
Secretariat
(Sec(O)), on 18 December, and Mr Lee and Mr Webb on 20
December.443
914.
The DFID
record of the meetings stated that the MOD appreciated the
importance
of DFID-MOD
dialogue, especially on humanitarian issues, but that “the issue
of
Operational
Security (Op Sec) is a hurdle to early and more consistent
consultation”.
The issue
was less the level of security clearance required than the “need to
know”,
which was
much more difficult to define.
915.
Mr Webb was
reported to be “clearly focused on aftermath planning”. Dr
Brewer
set out Ms
Short’s interest in “post-conflict stabilisation strategies” and
agreed that she
(Dr Brewer)
and he should discuss the issue on 10 January.
916.
The record
also stated that the meetings had confirmed that little thought
was
being given
to humanitarian operations. Dr Brewer raised the issue of a
stabilisation
force and
stated that: “Making a demonstrable (and rapid) difference to the
civil
population’s
lives was vital to the success of any political-military plan and
to wider
regional
stability.” Mr Lee “saw the advantage of HMG [Her Majesty’s
Government]-wide
discussion”.
917.
Mr Lee
commented afterwards to Lt Gen Pigott: “From a machinery of
government
and
successful Iraq policy perspective all the arguments are surely in
favour of including
… DFID
individuals in our discussions.”444
He
explained that No.10 would not, however,
accept
this:
“At David
Manning’s meeting today … when asked by Peter Ricketts
whether
DFID could
attend the COBR(R), David had immediately said ‘no’. This was
on
the grounds
that DFID officials would feel bound to report what they had heard
to
Clare Short
… it was not acceptable to incorporate Ms Short herself into this
level
of
debate.”
442
Public
hearing, 13 January 2010, page 8.
443
Minute
[DFID junior official] to Brewer, 20 December 2002, ‘Meetings with
MOD officials’.
444
Minute Lee
to Policy Director, 20 December 2002, ‘DFID Involvement in Iraq
Planning and
Preparations’.
266