6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
262.
Mr Stephens
summarised the key issues:
•
Demands on
police resources arising from the possibility of
simultaneous
challenges,
including “heightened security environment, support to
military
preparations,
public order and the possible renewal of the firefighters’
dispute”.
Mr Stephens
stated that the Cabinet Office and Home Office had work in
hand
on the
issue, in conjunction with the police and the MOD.
•
Policy on
bringing Iraqi prisoners of war or civilian casualties to the UK
for
treatment.
The IPU and CCS were co-ordinating work on the issue.
•
Fuel
disruption. DTI and
CCS had identified short-term mitigation measures and
longer-term
resilience options.
•
Military
Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA).
Departments had confirmed that
there were
no major concerns. The Cabinet Office was working separately
on
provision
of military resources for civil contingencies.
•
Impact on
departments of fuel price rises.
Departments had confirmed they did
not expect
major problems.
263.
Mr Stephens
listed additional action points for departments on specific
issues
related to
public order, community cohesion, asylum and the NHS.
264.
The PJHQ
planning seminar to discuss the UK Common Document
took
place on 5
February.
265.
Participants
were told by PJHQ that US planning was moving fast and
that
within a
week or so it would be very difficult to reverse what the US had
decided.
266.
The PJHQ Phase
IV planning seminar on 5 February was attended by
junior
officials
from the Cabinet Office (Mr Tom Dodd, OD Sec), DFID
(Mr Fernie) and the
FCO.129
Discussion
centred on the PJHQ Common Document (given the title
‘Iraq –
Phase IV
Subjects’), which set out UK and US positions on post-conflict
security,
reconstruction,
civil administration and humanitarian assistance, and issues
needing
resolution.
267.
The FCO record
of the seminar was addressed to Mr Chilcott and
summarised
the key
messages from PJHQ planners:
•
US planning
was “going ahead fast, whether we like it or not”. Once
Secretary
Rumsfeld
had signed it off “in about a week’s time” it would be “very
difficult to
reverse
what has been decided”.
129
Minute MED
[junior official] to Chilcott, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: PJHQ Meeting
on “Aftermath”’ attaching
Paper
[unattributed], 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq – Phase IV
Subjects’.
357