3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
814.
Cabinet was
not provided with, or informed of, Mr Brummell’s letter
to
Mr Rycroft
of 14 March; or Mr Rycroft’s response of 15 March. Cabinet was
not
told how
Mr Blair had reached the view recorded in Mr Rycroft’s
letter.
815.
The
consideration of the legal basis for military action and the
evidence from
those
present on the discussion of the legal issues in Cabinet is
addressed in
Section
5.
816.
The
majority of Cabinet members who gave evidence to the Inquiry
took
the
position that the role of the Attorney General on 17 March was,
simply, to tell
Cabinet
whether or not there was a legal basis for military
action.
817.
None of
those Ministers who had read Lord Goldsmith’s 7 March
advice
asked for
an explanation as to why his legal view of resolution 1441 had
changed.
818.
There was
little appetite to question Lord Goldsmith about his advice,
and
no
substantive discussion of the legal issues was
recorded.
819.
Cabinet
was, however, being asked to confirm the decision that
the
diplomatic
process was at an end and that the House of Commons
should
be asked to
endorse the use of military action to enforce Iraq’s
compliance.
Given the
gravity of this decision, Cabinet should have been made aware
of
the legal uncertainties.
820.
Lord
Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice
which
fully
reflected the position on 17 March, explained the legal basis on
which the
UK could
take military action, and set out the risks of legal
challenge.
821.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw continued to attribute the primary responsibility
for
the failure
to secure support in the Security Council to France’s statements
that
it would
veto a resolution setting an ultimatum for Iraq to demonstrate that
it was
co-operating
as required by resolution 1441.
822.
As the
evidence in this Section shows, the Security Council was
deeply
divided and
China, France and Russia, and others, took the view that
options
other than
the use of military force had not yet been exhausted.
823.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Mr Blair had told Cabinet that “an
impasse
was an
impasse” and that the “French block” was “not conditional but
absolute”.288
824.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote:
“Apart from
Clare Short, the Cabinet were supportive. All my most loyal
people
weighed in.
As ever on these occasions, John Prescott was a rock. Derry
Irvine
[Lord
Irvine of Lairg, the Lord Chancellor] came in with a very helpful
intervention
288
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
543