9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
who are in
de facto control over many districts of Basra City. Baghdad’s
ability to
determine
events is very limited.
“II. The
primary reason for the recent reduction in attacks against the
Multi-National
Forces
(MNF) in Basra is the negotiation between MND(SE) and [JAM1]. It
is
unclear how
long this can be sustained when or if all JAM personnel have
been
released …
in the absence of continuing visible momentum towards full
departure of
UK forces
we judge that the point would eventually be reached when JAM sees
the
balance of
advantage in resuming their campaign against the MNF. Sporadic
attacks
will
continue in any case.
“III. As
the MNF presence reduces and provincial elections approach,
intra-Shia
violence is
likely to intensify. We cannot predict the scale. Concern to
avoid
provoking
US intervention, pressure from national Shia political leader,
Grand
Ayatollah
al-Sistani and probably the Iranians, and a desire among at least
some
of Basra’s
political leaders and security officials to reach local
accommodations will
all help
restrain the militias. If street fighting did break out, it is
likely to be of short
duration,
but in the worst case could surpass the small-scale skirmishes in
other
provinces
that have transitioned to Iraqi control.
“IV. The
Iraqis would only call for MNF re-intervention in Basra as a last
resort, in the
event of
violence over an extended period beyond the capacity of the Iraqi
army and
police.
Locally-raised army units are unlikely to be willing or able to
cope in the event
of serious
and sustained intra-Shia clashes, but new units are being deployed
which
are loyal
to the central government and are likely to be more effective in
dealing with
low level
violence. The largely ineffective local police are heavily
infiltrated by militias
and would
take sides in any fighting.
“V. Iran’s
aim is to speed the withdrawal of coalition forces while making
their life
as
difficult as possible so long as they remain: the Iranians will
continue providing
training,
weaponry and encouragement for Shia extremists to attack the MNF.
Iran’s
ability to
determine political outcomes or ease intra-Shia tensions is
limited: it is
unlikely to
want to take sides in the event of clashes between rival Shia
factions.”
450.
The JIC
assessed that Muqtada al-Sadr’s public call for a cessation of
JAM
violence
might also have been a factor in the reduced number of attacks
against the
MNF. Other
possible factors included a positive reaction by the militias and
their political
sponsors to
the withdrawal of UK forces from Basra City and efforts by Gen
Mohan and
Gen Jalil
to improve the performance of the ISF.
“It is
unclear how long the lull can be sustained. Its success to date
suggests that …
has the
backing of the majority of mainstream JAM in Basra for his tactics,
despite
initial
reporting showing that some local commanders were sceptical …
personal
ambitions
are unclear … suggested that JAM’s aim following withdrawal of
UK
267