The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1089.
Asked why,
given US opposition to a leading role for the UN in post-conflict
Iraq,
the UK did
not have a plan B, Mr Straw told the Inquiry:
“… the only
plan B … in the absence of a central role for the UN, was a central
role
for the
Occupiers, which were the US and the UK. Those were the two
alternatives.
There was
lots and lots of discussion with the United States system
…
“… [I]t
wasn’t for the want of trying that we ended up in the position we
did, but this
was one of
those absolute classics where the American decision making
process
was opaque
… you put all these things in and it just sort of flows around and
one
day there
is a decision.”467
1090.
Mr Straw
had been aware since January, when Mr Ricketts had likened
the
process of
changing US views to “water on a stone”, that it would be
extremely
difficult
to secure US support for the UK’s preferred option.
1091.
It was
Mr Straw’s responsibility as Foreign Secretary to give
due
consideration
to the range of options available to the UK should that
effort
fail. Those
included making UK participation in military action
conditional
on a satisfactory
post-conflict plan.
1092.
Section 6.4
states that Mr Straw did not do so in January
2003.
1093.
Nor did he
address that gap between January and March.
1094.
FCO
guidance on Phase IV sent to all UK diplomatic posts on 19
March
stated:
“Providing the conditions for success exist – a legal basis for
action from
the UNSC
and a secure environment in which to act – we would expect all
the
traditional
nation-builders to take part.”
1095.
On 19 March,
the FCO sent a “Core Script” on Iraq for all diplomatic posts to
use
at their
discretion with key contacts.468
1096.
The same text
was circulated to No.10 and key departments the next
day.469
The covering
letter to No.10 stated:
“Until now
we have been reluctant to discuss openly how we see Phase
IV
unfolding.
As military action begins, we shall wish to ensure that our ideas
for Phase
IV – the
means by which we shall deliver our ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi
People’ –
are given
greater prominence.”
1097.
The paper
carried the caveat that it represented current UK thinking,
not
necessarily
agreed Coalition policy, and would evolve as Phase III unfolded. If
military
467
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, pages 118-119.
468
Telegram
150 FCO London to Abidjan (parts 1 and 2), 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Core Script – Phase IV’.
469
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Core Script’ attaching
Paper Iraq Planning Unit,
19 March
2003, ‘Iraq: Core Script – Phase IV (Post-Conflict)’.
506