The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Government
(ITG) by 31 January 2005, was agreed by Governing Council on 1
March
(see
Section 9.2).
956.
The 8 March
meeting of the ISOG was advised that the UK civilian presence
in
Basra after
the transition could not yet be defined, pending PMO
decisions.559
957.
The ISOG was
also advised that the UK was opposed to US plans for a
“Transition
Board”,
reporting to the US Ambassador, to co-ordinate international
advisers in Iraqi
ministries
after the transition. More broadly, the UK was against any “US-led
post-
Occupation
structures whether they be in the political, security or
development fields,
whatever
the extent of de facto US influence”.
958.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock called on Mr Blair on 11 March.560
Sir Jeremy
reported that
the flow of
US funds remained slow, even to the security forces. In the
electricity sector,
the gap
between supply and demand would widen over the summer. Economic
progress
in poorer
districts remained slow and unemployment was high. The South,
starting from
a lower
baseline, was “more contented”, but managing expectations was
crucial.
959.
Sir Jeremy
thought that presentation of policy to Iraqis had improved,
although
much ground
had been lost to Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera. CPA
communications
remained
fixated on the US audience.
960.
The 12 March
meeting of the ISG discussed a draft Transition Plan for
Iraq
produced by
the FCO.561
The ISG
concluded that:
“One of our
main concerns was what the CPA would turn into. A gap in
programmes
between the
end of CPA and the formation of the interim Government would
cause
problems,
not least for security. Continuity was therefore essential and
capacity
needed to
be maintained. The answer was for [international] advisers to shift
into
[Iraqi]
ministries …”
961.
The 18 March
meeting of the AHMGIR considered a revised version of
the
962.
The Plan
stated that the transition had to be seen as a clear transfer
of
power,
although the new Iraqi Government would still need wide-ranging
assistance.
Issues
included:
•
Establishing
a transparent and robust framework for managing Iraqi
funds
(including
oil revenues). The CPA was drafting an organic Budget Law,
which
UK
officials were lobbying to improve. Higher than expected oil
revenues
559
Minute Dodd
to Crompton, 8 March 2004, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials
Meeting’.
560
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 11 March 2004, ‘Iraq: Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s Call
on the Prime Minister’.
561
Minute Dodd
to Sheinwald, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq Strategy Group’.
562 Annotated
Agenda, 18 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting
attaching Paper FCO,
17 March
2004, ‘Iraq: Transition Plan’.
166