12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Hoon and
Ms Short.59
The vision
was that the UK
“should aim
to leave Iraq radically changed for the better”.60
75.
The paper
listed a number of mission objectives, including the formation of
an
Iraq which
“has appropriately sized, reformed armed forces and
intelligence/security
agencies”
and “has a fair justice sector”.
76.
The paper was
structured to match the US organisation of Phase IV into
three
stages:
•
Alpha –
military administration while UN agencies and
Non‑Governmental
Organisations
(NGOs) “tackle the humanitarian crisis”.
•
Bravo – an
“international civil transitional administration”, supported
by
UN‑mandated
Coalition military, which would “take forward the programme
of
ambitious
reforms … to transform Iraq along the lines of the
vision”.
•
Charlie –
the handover to a democratically elected Iraqi Government,
during
which the
international community would continue to support the restructuring
of
Iraq’s
economy and public administration. “Training of the armed forces
and of
the police
and judiciary may also continue in Phase IV Charlie.”
77.
The FCO sent a
draft ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ to No.10 on
28
February.61
That
version made no reference to the security sector, but did state
that the
UK would
“help” by “supporting institutional and administrative
reform”.
78.
The UK’s
objectives were described again in a paper prepared by the IPU for
a
meeting
chaired by Mr Blair on 6 March.62
The paper
sought Ministerial agreement to
a number
of objectives for the UK’s post‑conflict Occupation of Iraq,
including that Iraq:
•
“Has armed
forces and intelligence services that are of an appropriate
size
(striking a
balance between not threatening its neighbours and protecting
the
territorial
integrity of Iraq) and are well on the way to being reformed”;
and
•
“Respects
human rights and has made significant progress towards a fair
and
effective
justice sector.”
79.
The IPU paper
was not discussed at the meeting, so the draft objectives
for
post‑conflict
Iraq were incorporated into another IPU paper describing “the UK
overall
plan for
Phase IV” and submitted to Mr Blair by Mr Matthew
Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, on 7 March63
and again
by Mr Cannon on 12 March.64
59
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 26 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Phase IV’.
60
Paper IPU,
25 February 2002, ‘UK Vision for Phase IV’.
61
Minute Owen
to Rycroft, 28 February 2003, ‘A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi
People’.
62
Paper IPU,
5 March 2003, ‘Planning for the UK’s Role in Iraq after
Saddam’.
63
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Weekend
Papers’.
64
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post‑Conflict
Planning: Objectives
and Principles’.
81