15.1 | Civilian
personnel
399.
Sir Peter
reported that, although security was a major preoccupation in
Baghdad,
the threat
from indirect fire seemed to be lower than in Basra and the ability
to move
around the
Green Zone reduced the sense of claustrophobia. The arrangement
with the
RAF for
guaranteed helicopter hours280
seemed to
work reasonably well, although there
were some
serviceability problems with the helicopters.
400.
In Basra staff
felt “pretty beleaguered”. The main complaint was the
difficulty
getting in
and out:
“It often
takes two or even three days for staff to get to/from Kuwait, given
the
frequent
delays or cancellations in the helicopter flights to Basra airport,
and then
the
uncertainties of the RAF surf flights up to Baghdad and then on to
Kuwait.
This is intensely
frustrating as well as inefficient, and is leading some staff
to
consider
not taking breather breaks because of the hassle.”
401.
Sir Peter
recommended taking up the issue with the MOD at a high
level.
The Basra
team perceived that the service had reduced recently because of
other
operational
pressures on MOD assets:
“It must be
in the MOD’s interests to ensure the viability of the Palace
Compound,
given the
need for an overall plan in the South. Perhaps we should look again
at
contracting
for a specified number of helicopter hours per month (as in
Baghdad).
Failing
that, I wonder whether there might be a commercial solution
…”
402.
Sir Peter
concluded with a suggestion that, after a period of heavy
capital
investment
and a big increase in staff, there was probably scope “to start
squeezing
down on
running costs, eg for the security contracts”.
403.
On 12 April,
Mr Richmond, now FCO Director General Defence and
Intelligence,
and
Mr Asquith discussed the Basra air bridge with Lieutenant
General Nicholas
Houghton,
Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), who had returned from Iraq in
March.281
Mr Richmond
and Mr Asquith explained that:
•
The FCO
would need “much greater confidence in the reliability of air
transport”
between the
Basra Palace site, Basra Airport and Kuwait if it was to keep
the
staff
drawdown to levels that did not have a significant impact on the
UK’s ability
to achieve
its objectives.
•
Long delays
were preventing staff engaged in the SSR programme from
carrying
out their
objectives.
•
They
“suspected that the problem was a mixture of military priorities
and
resources”.
It was essential that the military viewed the operation in Basra
as
“a team
effort”.
404.
Lt
Gen Houghton undertook to investigate the causes of the
delays. He advised
that if it
was a resource problem, it could probably be resolved only at
Ministerial level.
280
The Inquiry
has not seen details of the terms of this arrangement.
281
Minute
Asquith to PS/PUS [FCO], 13 April 2006, ‘Basra’.
313