The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

20. In mid‑November, the Joint Intelligence Committee reviewed its July 2002

Assessment of regime cohesion in Iraq.

21. The JIC judged that Iraq had accepted resolution 1441 to avert a large‑scale

US‑led ground attack and it would focus on concealing sensitive items from the

inspectors.

22. If Saddam Hussein believed a large‑scale attack was inevitable, he would

probably cease co‑operation and become far more confrontational.

23. In parallel with the adoption of resolution 1441, the JIC decided to revisit its July

2002 assessment of regime cohesion in Iraq to:

“… examine how the Iraqi regime is responding to mounting international

pressure … [and] assess whether there are any signs of strain within the regime and

evaluate the speed and effectiveness of Iraqi decision‑making.”5

24. In the JIC discussion of the draft Assessment on 13 November, three key points

were made:

• The draft Key Judgement that the cracks in the Iraqi regime had not widened

since the last Assessment was correct.

• Concealment and the retention of a WMD capability “remained a cornerstone of

Saddam’s policy” and his intention was to allow the inspectors in and “manage”

the inspections indefinitely as a means of avoiding conflict. But the resolution

put the onus on Iraq to prove it had no WMD programmes. The inspectors

would need to be prepared to deal with diversionary tactics including lengthy

inspections of sites not related to WMD. The UN Monitoring, Verification and

Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) would “eventually” bring pressure to bear

on Saddam Hussein, “causing further cracks in the regime”.

• The Assessment should address the extent to which cracks might widen, the

role of regime members and how concerns about their personal survival might

affect their support for Iraq’s WMD policy.6

25. The Key Judgements of the JIC were:

“• Iraq accepted UNSCR 1441 because Saddam knew this was the only way to

avert a large‑scale US‑led Coalition ground attack. The regime probably believes

that a Coalition attack will not be possible when inspectors are inside Iraq.

5 JIC Assessment, 14 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under Pressure’.

6 Minutes, 13 November 2002, JIC meeting.

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