The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
13.
In February
2003, Treasury officials provided Mr Brown with the first
comprehensive
estimate of
military and civilian costs for the conflict and post‑conflict
period. The cost of
a military
campaign was estimated at £3.4bn over three years, with a further
£1bn in the
first year
after a conflict for post‑conflict military operations. The cost of
a UK contribution
to
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction was estimated at up to
£0.75bn in the
first year
after a conflict (representing 10 percent of the cost of the total
international
effort).
The Treasury indicated that costs for military operations beyond
2004/05 and for
humanitarian
assistance and reconstruction beyond 2003/04 were
unknown.
14.
Treasury
officials advised Mr Brown that their estimate reflected the
“biggest
commitment”
that the UK could make in the post‑conflict period – taking
military
responsibility
for a geographical area of Iraq.3
The costs
of such a commitment would be
substantial
and could extend into the long term.
15.
Given the
uncertainties over the scale of the UK’s military presence in
post‑conflict
Iraq, and
the inevitable uncertainties over the scale of any post‑conflict
humanitarian
crisis and
reconstruction challenge, the Treasury’s February 2003 estimates
were
remarkably
accurate.
16.
Mr Paul
Boateng, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury from 2002 to 2005,
told the
Inquiry
that the Treasury’s analyses of the impact of war on the UK’s
public finances
were not
conducted with the intention of “second‑guessing” Ministers, but to
enable the
Treasury to
contribute to planning and policy discussions.4
17.
The Inquiry
agrees that the Treasury’s analyses should have contributed to
planning
and policy
discussions.
18.
Mr Brown
told the Inquiry that, in his discussions with Cabinet colleagues
in
the months
leading up to the invasion, he made it clear that the Treasury
would not
“interfere”
by suggesting that cost should be a factor in choosing one military
option over
another:
“That was
not our job ... At every point, I made it clear that we would
support
whatever
option the military decided upon with the Prime Minister and
the
19.
Section 6.5
addresses the Government’s failure to establish a
unified
planning
process across the four principal departments involved – the
Foreign and
Commonwealth
Office (FCO), the MOD, DFID and the Treasury – or between
military
and
civilian planners, in the pre‑conflict period.
3
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Update
on Iraq’ attaching Paper
Treasury,
19 February 2003, ‘Iraq Conflict – Public Expenditure
Impact’.
4
Public
hearing, 14 July 2010, page 22.
5
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, pages 25‑26.
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