10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

536.  Baroness Amos’ meetings with Mr Vieira de Mello and Ambassador Bremer

focused on the political process and are considered in Section 9.2.

537.  Sir David Manning sent a note to Mr Blair on 2 July, in advance of a video

conference between Mr Blair and President Bush, offering advice on the conversation.288

He stated:

“This is a key exchange.”

538.  Of the messages that were vital to get across, Sir David identified security as the

top priority and suggested (noting that the MOD would probably disagree) a surge of

large numbers of troops into Iraq to get through the “security crisis”. This should be

accompanied by an accelerated reconstruction programme and a “very vigorous political

programme” plus an effective media strategy.

539.  Cabinet met on 3 July, before the video conference.289 In the course of the meeting,

Mr Straw, Baroness Amos and Mr Hoon all emphasised that security was the main issue.

Mr Blair concluded that the UK should make CPA(South) “a model”.

540.  The video conference took place later that day. In addition to the President and

Mr Blair, Mr Hoon, Mr Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney and senior UK and US officials

joined the conference in London and Washington. Ambassador Bremer, Mr Sawers

and General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander Combined Joint Task Force – 7, dialled in

from Iraq.

541.  Mr Blair began by congratulating Ambassador Bremer on the “remarkable

performance” of the CPA.290

542.  Mr Blair then listed areas of concern, including:

• Security. This was hampering CPA efforts at reconstruction; what more did the

CPA need?

• Reconstruction. Mr Blair underlined the urgency of rebuilding power and water

infrastructure and asked whether there were particular obstacles that needed

to be removed. He observed that Iraqi public expectations were outrunning the

CPA’s capacity to respond.

• Communications. It was essential to improve the CPA’s capacity to communicate

with the people of Iraq and handle the local and international media.

543.  Mr Blair concluded that the UK would do its “level best to meet any demand for

additional resources. If there were any obstacles that needed clearing, Sawers/Bremer

should tell him.”

288  Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 2 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Your Video Conference with President Bush’.

289  Cabinet Conclusions, 3 July 2003.

290  Letter Cannon to McDonald, 3 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Video-Conference with President Bush,

3 July’.

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