3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
456.
Mr Blair’s
seventh principle identified the need to “reach out to the
Muslim
world”.
Mr Blair stated: “The reason there is opposition over our
stance on Iraq has
less
to do with any love of Saddam, but over a sense of double
standards. The MEPP
remains
essential …”
457.
In PMQs on
8 January Mr Blair reiterated his position that if Saddam
Hussein
did not
disarm voluntarily he would be disarmed by force, but he declined
to
speculate
about the circumstances when that would be necessary.
458.
Iraq and
reports of differences between Mr Straw and Mr Hoon were
raised by
several
Members of Parliament during Prime Minister’s Questions on 8
January.156
459.
Mr Blair
consistently reiterated his position that Iraq must comply with the
Security
Council
resolutions and “must be disarmed of all weapons of mass
destruction”. If Iraq
did not do
so willingly, it would “have to be done by force”.
460.
Mr Blair
declined to respond to questions from Mr Iain Duncan Smith
about
whether he
agreed with Mr Straw’s view that the prospects of military
action were
“60:40 against”.
461.
Mr Duncan
Smith also commented that “one cannot half prepare for war. Not
for
the first
time, the Government are sending different messages to different
audiences …”
462.
Referring to
Mr Hoon’s statement the previous day, Mr Blair
replied:
“We have
made every preparation that we should make … It is completely
wrong
to say
that British troops are half prepared for any action. That is
nonsense.”
463.
In response to
questions from Mr Charles Kennedy about whether Britain
would
be involved
if the inspectors failed to produce concrete evidence of weapons of
mass
destruction
but the US “nonetheless” decided to go ahead with military action,
Mr Blair
replied
that he was “not going to speculate on the circumstances that might
arise”.
The weapons
inspectors were “in Iraq to discover whether there has been a
breach
of the
UN resolution” and they should be “allowed to do their
work”.
•
Mrs Anne
Campbell (Labour) that she was “right to say that people
have
anxieties
about the possibility of conflict in Iraq” and that British troops
“should
never” be
put into action “unless it is necessary to do so”, but he
“believed
passionately
that the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the related
issue
of
international terrorism” were the “key security threats” facing the
UK and that
it was
“only a matter of time before those issues come together”;
and
156
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 8 January
2003, columns 162‑166.
83