The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
senior
UK officers who were able to work closely with the US chain of
command
is
likely to have been one of the most important determinants of
influence on
operational
matters.
472.
Overall,
however, the plan and its implementation reflected US decisions
and
priorities.
473.
While the
evidence does not suggest it was the determining
factor
in the
choices made by the UK Government about the forces deployed
for
military
operations in Iraq, the likelihood of influencing US decisions
should
not
be overstated. In any future consideration of the UK
contribution to any
US‑led
operation where the scale and nature of that contribution is
essentially
discretionary,
as it was in Iraq the UK should be more realistic about what
can
be achieved.
474.
In
addition, for success, clarity is required about:
•
the
objectives to be sought;
•
their
importance to the UK national interest; and
•
how they
are to be achieved.
475.
The UK’s
desire and ability to influence the US military timetable and
wider
strategic
choices about the use of military force, including whether
conditions
identified
by the UK had been met, are addressed in Sections
3.1-3.8.
476.
The UK
influence on US thinking at the early stages of the development
of
the
campaign plan for an invasion of Iraq in the summer and early
autumn of 2002,
and in
particular the need for a second, northern axis, is addressed in
Section 6.1.
477.
The other
evidence available does not enable the Inquiry to make
a
considered
judgement about specific issues on which the UK
successfully
influenced
US decisions.
478.
On 14 March
2003, Adm Boyce described the final campaign plan as “designed
by
the US,
although it has been, and continues to be, influenced by UK
officers embedded
in the
various relevant US and Coalition headquarters”.309
479.
In his
National Contingent Commander’s report, dated 8 May, AM Burridge
judged
that:
“Embedding
staff in HQ CENTCOM allowed the UK to exercise significant
influence
and
maintained a very nimble information flow.” 310
309
Minute CDS
to SofS [MOD], 14 March 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Command and
Control’.
310
Minute
Burridge to Reith, 8 May 2003, ‘Operation TELIC – Report by
NCC’.
86